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Covert surveillance unlawful European Court Of Human Rights Armstrong v United Kingdom (Application No 48521/99) Before M. Pellonpää, President and Judges Sir Nicolas Bratza, A. Pastor Ridruejo, E. Palm, V. Straznicka, R. Maruste and S. Pavlovschi Section Registrar M. O'Boyle Judgment July 16, 2002 The European Court of Human Rights held, unanimously, that covert surveillance carried out by the police violated the applicant's right to respect for private life, as guaranteed by article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as the right to an effective remedy, guaranteed by article 13. On January 27, 1997, Mark Armstrong, a United Kingdom national, pleaded guilty to charges of conspiracy to supply class A and class B drugs, after the trial judge had ruled disputed evidence admissible. On February 6, 1997, he was sentenced to nine years imprisonment. His application to seek leave to appeal was refused on January 28, 1999. The evidence in question resulted from a covert surveillance operation involving observation and recording of conversations in the home of one of Mr Armstrong's co-defendants, allegedly from October 1994 to January 1995 and in April 1995. According to the applicant, the authority for such surveillance had been sought and granted by a chief superintendent rather than a chief constable on the purported grounds that the drug operation conducted by the defendants was of such sophistication that conventional evidence gathering techniques were ineffective. The defendants challenged the admissibility of the evidence on ground of improper compliance with the Home Office guidelines and argued that the judge should exercise his discretion to exclude the recordings. As the taped conversations constituted the sole evidence against the applicant, a trial within a trial regarding the assertions was conducted. I Alleged violation of article 8 The applicant invoked article 8 of the Convention in respect of the use of a covert surveillance device by the police to record conversations at the flat of one of his co-defendants. Article 8 provides in so far as relevant: "1 Everyone has the right to respect for his private ... life... "2 There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." The Government accepted, following the judgment in Khan v United Kingdom (No 35394/97) (The Times May 23, 2000) that the use of the audio recording device amounted to an interference with the applicant's right to private life under article 8.1 and that the measures were not used in accordance with law within article 8.2. The Court recalled, as in Khan, that at the relevant time there existed no statutory system to regulate the use of covert recording devices by the police. The Court therefore held, unanimously, that the interferences disclosed by the measures implemented in respect of the applicant were not "in accordance with the law" as required by article 8.2 and there had accordingly been a violation. II Alleged violation of article 13 The applicant complained that he did not have an effective remedy concerning the surveillance measures implemented against him. The Government accepted that that was indeed the case at the relevant time in respect of the violations of his right to private life under article 8. The Court therefore found, unanimously, that there had been a violation. III Application of article 41 The applicant, who was legally aided, was requested on September 28, 2001 and on March 13, 2002 to submit details of his claim for just satisfaction. On the latter date, he was requested to provide those details by April 3, 2002. No details had been lodged by the date of the judgment. In the circumstances, the Court found no basis on which to make an award and considered that the finding of a violation of the Convention could be regarded as constituting sufficient just satisfaction. Print this article Send to a friend Back to top of page |