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**Children Locked Up! Who are they? Where are they?**

At any given time almost fifteen hundred children in England are 'locked up' in secure children's homes, Young Offender Institutions, secure training centres and mental health wards, either for their own safety or the safety of others. These are some of the most vulnerable children in the country who, for whatever reason, we have not been able to help to live freely in their own homes or communities. Locking children up is an extreme form of intervention. Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights sets out in what circumstances it is allowed, and the legal protections that should be in place. The Children's Commissioner has a clear responsibility to advocate for these children living in secure settings, sometimes far away from their family, friends and home.

The Youth Justice System detains children in Young Offender Institutions, Secure Training Centres and Secure Children's Homes when they have committed certain crimes. Local Authorities can also place children in Secure Children's Homes in order to keep them safe, and children can be detained under the Mental Health Act in mental health wards if they are suffering from a mental illness and pose a risk to themselves or others1.

The information on these children is therefore held by the Ministry of Justice, Department for Education, NHS England and Local Authorities, with no single point of access or consistency about exactly what information is gathered. We have combined this data to show that 1,465 children in England were securely detained in March 2018, of whom 873 were in youth justice settings, 505 were detained under the Mental Health Act, and 87 were in secure children's homes for their own welfare.

However, we know that this is not a complete picture. Published NHS England figures cover only about three quarters of mental health settings as not all services provide data, so some children may be missed. Published sources do not provide monthly information on children's ages or how long they stay in NHS secure settings, although they do provide an overview of the age and ethnicity of all children detained over the course of the year. In contrast, the Ministry of Justice provides more detailed information about how long children stay, why they are there and their ages and ethnicities, while the Department for Education also publishes information on children's ages and how long they stay. None of these departments publish administrative data on a regular basis about the needs of these children, for example, their mental health diagnoses, Special Educational Needs or family problems.

There are also children deprived of their liberty who are invisible to us. These are children who do not show up in the published data because they don't fit into any of the categories above, and the legal basis for detention is not set out in any single piece of legislation. There are no publicly available figures about how many of them there are or where they are living. Although this report did find, by requesting data from the courts, that there are at least 211 children who were detained in this way in 2018, we do not have information showing where they live or how long they have been there.

Adding up the cost of the placements for these children is a stark reminder of the price of social failure: we estimate that we spend around £309 million a year on these 1,465 children in England – and this does not even include those 'invisible' children whose settings we don't have information about. However, the amount spent per child varies wildly depending on the setting they are in. A child living in a Medium secure mental health unit is seven times as 'expensive' as a child in a YOI.

There is no doubt that all these children need extremely intensive help, but it is not always clear that they are getting the right help at the right time. The needs of children in different settings are increasingly understood to be quite similar2, with no clear-cut distinction between children in need of protection and children who have committed crimes.

This report shines a light on all these children behind closed doors, asking who they are and where they are living. It looks at what we know and, crucially, what we don't know about them, so that we can begin to assess whether they are getting the most appropriate support. We must make sure that children do not simply become defined by the institution they happen to be locked up in.

**20 Convictions for Fraud May be Quashed as the Expert Witness in the Trials Had No Expertise**

The safety of convictions secured in more than 20 fraud trials may have to be examined after an expert witness was found to be inadequately qualified. The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) has abandoned a case against eight defendants in a carbon credit and diamond sales hearing after defence lawyers cross-examined Andrew Ager. According to the lawyers' website, at 2 Hare Court chambers in London, Ager was found to have no academic qualifications and could not remember if he had passed his A-levels. He also admitted he had never read a book on carbon credits, although he had once watched a documentary about such permits.

The problem emerged when Narita Bahra QC, representing Steven Sulley, one of the eight men acquitted of fraud at Southwark crown court on Wednesday, questioned Ager about his background. Ager said he kept sensitive material given to him by police in a cupboard under the stairs and that some was lost during a leak. Thereafter it was kept in a locked box on his balcony. Ager was used in more than 20 fraud prosecutions as an expert witness, she said. "As a result of the cross-examination of Mr Ager, the safety of the convictions in every previous carbon credits prosecution is now in question." Her chambers' statement went on: "It is apparent that there are systemic failures within the investigation and disclosure processes at City of London police that are likely to impact upon all prosecutions undertaken in the last eight years."

Prosecutors offered no evidence in the trial of the eight men for conspiracy to defraud at Southwark crown court and all the defendants were acquitted. The case centred on the sale of investment opportunities in carbon credits between November 2011 and February 2014. Carbon credits are permits that allow companies or countries to emit a certain amount of carbon dioxide gas. Theycan be traded for cash if the limit is not reached. City of London police apologised in the wake of the case collapsing. A spokeswoman said: "This has been an enormously complex case of seven years' duration. The case illustrates the significant change in the way fraud itself has evolved, along with our response in dealing with it. Together with our colleagues in the CPS, we apologise that the evidential and procedural issues in the case have led to its dismissal."

The acquitted defendants were: Sulley, 33, from Orpington, Kent; Christopher Woolcott, 37, from Longfield, Kent; Christopher Chapman, 31, from Fulham, south-west London; Lewis Deakin, 28, from Gravesend, Kent; Marcus Allen, 31, from Brixton, south London; Ashley Hunte, 37, from Beckenham, Kent; Daniel Martin, 42, from West Malling, Kent; and David Pierce, 32, from Billericay, Essex.

A spokesman for the CPS said: "We have a duty to continuously review all our cases. Information has recently been brought to the attention of CPS which has led to the conclusion that our legal test for prosecution was no longer met and that it would be wrong to continue with the case against the defendants."

### Large Compensation Payout for Prisoner Who Died of Dehydration

BBC News: The family of a US man who died of dehydration while in jail will receive $6.75m (£6m) from Milwaukee County and a private company that ran inmate care. Terrill Thomas, 38, was found dead in his cell in Milwaukee County Jail in 2016 - seven days after officers shut off his water supply as punishment. His death was later ruled a homicide by the Milwaukee County Medical Examiner, the result of "profound dehydration".

Thomas' attorneys called the sum one of the largest ever for a jail death. "This settlement reflects not only the profound harm suffered by Mr Thomas and his family, but also the shocking nature of the defendants' misconduct in shutting off this man's water and ignoring his obvious signs of distress as he literally died of thirst," said lawyers for Thomas in a joint statement to US media.

The settlement was publicly announced on Tuesday after being finalised in March. The cost will be split between Milwaukee County and Armor Correctional Health Services, a private company that provided health care for inmates at the time. Neither Armor Correctional Health Services and Milwaukee County immediately responded to requests for comment. The almost $7m will be split among Thomas' six children, according to AP News.

Thomas was arrested in April 2016 on charges that he fired a gun inside a casino. According to his lawyers, Thomas suffered from bipolar disorder and was in the midst of an "acute mental health crisis" when he arrived at Milwaukee County Jail. Thomas was soon moved to an isolation cell as punishment for flooding his first cell with a mattress, which his lawyers said was evidence of his deteriorating mental state. As further punishment, Thomas' only source of drinking water was deliberately cut off - a "common and widespread practice" at the jail, court documents say.

The affidavit detailed further elements of Thomas' punishment: the removal of his mattress and bedding, deprivation of food and a functioning toilet, and the denial of medical and mental health care. Thomas lost 34lb during the eight days he was in custody - over 10% of his body weight. In his last day alive, Thomas "was simply lying naked on his cell floor, barely able to move, severely dehydrated, literally dying of thirst", court documents said. After an inquest into Thomas' death, Milwaukee prosecutors filed criminal charges against three jail staffers who were involved in blocking Thomas' water supply or who lied to police during the investigation.

### Worsening Prisoner's Conditions During Prison Wardens' Strike: Degrading Treatment

In Chamber judgment in the case of Clasens v. Belgium (application no. 26564/16) the European Court of Human Rights held, unanimously, that there had been: a violation of Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment) of the European Convention on Human Rights, and a violation of Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) taken together with Article 3. The case concerned the deterioration in Mr Clasen's conditions of detention in Ittre Prison during a strike by prison wardens between April and June 2016.

The Court found that Mr Clasens' conditions of detention during the prison wardens' strike amounted to degrading treatment, resulting from the cumulative effect of ongoing lack of physical exercise, repeated breaches of the hygiene regulations, a lack of contact with the outside world and the uncertainty about whether his basic needs would be met. It considered that Mr Clasens had been subjected to distress of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention. The Court also held that the Belgian system, as it functioned at the relevant time, had not provided an effective remedy in practice – in other words, a remedy capable of affording redress for the situation of which Mr Clasens was a victim and preventing the continuation of the alleged violations.



### Home Office Empty Promises on Forensic Science Reform

House of Lords Select Committee: Forensic science in England and Wales is in trouble and unless the Home Office and Ministry of Justice act now, crimes may go unsolved and the number of miscarriages of justice may increase. To ensure the effective delivery of justice the House of Lords Science and Technology Committee have called for urgent reforms to forensic science in England and Wales in order to regain our world class reputation. The UK was once regarded as world-leading in forensic science but an absence of high-level leadership, a lack of funding and an insufficient level of research and development now means the UK is lagging behind others. The forensic science market is not properly regulated creating a state of crisis and a threat to the criminal justice system.

Lord Patel, Chairman of the Committee said: "A free society is dependent on the rule of law which in turn relies on equality of access to justice. Simultaneous budget cuts and reorganisation, together with exponential growth in the need for new services such as digital evidence has put forensic science providers under extreme pressure. The result is a forensic science market which, unless properly regulated, will soon suffer the shocks of major forensic science providers going out of business and putting justice in jeopardy. "The situation we are in cannot continue. Since 2012 the Home Office has made empty promises to give the Forensic Science Regulator statutory powers but still no action has been taken. We believe that seven years is an embarrassing amount of time to delay legislation; our forensic science provision has now reached breaking point and a complete overhaul is needed. "If our recommendations are implemented and the Government adequately invests in forensic science, our forensic science market can return to a world leading position."

Key findings from the report: The delivery of justice depends on the integrity and accuracy of forensic science evidence and the trust that society has in it. These failings must be recognised and changes made. Such action is now urgent and the Committee makes recommendations including: A Forensic Science Board should be created to deliver a new forensic science strategy and to take responsibility for forensic science in England and Wales. The remit and resources of the Forensic Science Regulator should be significantly reformed and expanded to include responsibility for regulating the market and given a number of statutory powers to bolster trust in the quality of forensic science including: issue improvement notices and fines; rescind a forensic science provider's accreditation and inspect, without notice, accredited forensic science providers.

The Legal Aid Agency should liaise with the market-regulation arm within the expanded role of the Forensic Science Regulator to set new pricing schemes for forensic testing and expert advice for defendants and that the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office should invest in research of automation techniques for data retrieval and analysis to tackle the issues with digital forensic analysis. To return the UK to its position as world-leading, a National Institute for Forensic Science should be created to set strategic priorities for forensic science research and development, and to coordinate and direct research and funding.

### Withdrawal of Life Support: Minimally Conscious Patients

Rosalind English, Human Rights Blog: A Clinical Commissioning Group v P (by her litigation friend the Official Solicitor) and TD [2019] EWCOP 18. The lesson to be learned from this case is to be careful of the hands into which you may fall, should you become incapacitated and end up in a vegetative or minimally conscious state. The patient in this case, P, was traumatised by a drug overdose in 2014. Since then she has been tracheotomy dependent and tube-fed. She is vulnerable to fitting, chest infections and other forms of ill-health. She was initially diagnosed as being in a vegetative state which was subsequently revised to that of a minimally conscious state. At the time of the

application she was in a unit specialising in rehabilitation for those suffering from neurological impairment. Staff at the Unit hold strong pro-life views. The CCG, the applicant in this case, was funding that treatment. There was no disagreement between the Official Solicitor, the CCG and the family as to the correct course of action; that Clinically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration (CANH) should be withdrawn. However, given the contrary views expressed by the staff who care for P, the CCG decided to bring this matter before the court. MacDonald J concluded that, whilst the application proceeded unopposed by all parties to it, it was appropriate to deliver a fully reasoned judgment.

As to capacity, there was no doubt that all of P's sensory input was "disordered". She can see, but it is impossible to determine the degree to which she is able to understand what she is seeing and her understand what she is seeing and her understanding of visual input is likely to be limited. She can hear, but it is impossible to know what she is able to understand.

On the question of her best interests, the evidence was compelling. The family told the court that P had had a relationship with a man who had suffered traumatic brain injury which required him to be placed on life support. P had been involved in the decision to terminate that support and she had said to her family that she would not want to be "left in such condition if anything [similar] happened to her". "if it ever happened to me I would not want to be a cabbage." P's family were of the view that her wishes would have been for treatment to be withdrawn. The Official Solicitor supported this position, as did the treating CCG applicant.

The staff at the treating Unit opposed discontinuation of CANH. They felt that P's responses to her experience showed that she had quality of life. Because of the rehabilitation unit's general pro-life position they had not provided the court with an end of life care plan should the Court authorise withdrawal of CANH. Within this context, the court was invited by the parties to make an 'in principle' decision with the parties to apply in the event of any disagreement over the care plan arrived at.

When considering P's best interests under the Mental Capacity Act, MacDonald J recalled the words of Hayden J in M v N regarding the interrelationship between the sanctity of life and cogently expressed wishes of the patient in question: the 'sanctity of life' or the 'intrinsic value of life', can be rebutted (pursuant to statute) on the basis of a competent adult's cogently expressed wish. It follows, to my mind, by parity of analysis, that the importance of the wishes and feelings of an incapacitated adult, communicated to the court via family or friends but with similar cogency and authenticity, are to be afforded no less significance that those of the capacitous.

Over fifteen years ago Munby J, observed in R (Burke) v GMC [2004] EWHC 1879 (Admin) that the obligation to preserve life is not absolute. "Important as the sanctity of life is, it may have to take second place to human dignity". MacDonald J attached considerable weight to evidence of P's own views on being left in a condition akin to that of her former partner. Neurological diagnoses advance, and the law has to keep up. There is, in the judge's view, "no prohibition on conducting a best interests analysis with respect to the continued provision of CANH even though P is not in a vegetative state but a minimally conscious one"

The evidence before the court as to P'S wishes was conclusive. Her past wishes should prevail over the "very strong presumption in favour of preserving her life, where those wishes were clearly against being kept alive in her current situation." "Whilst the 'pro-life' approach (as they themselves describe it) taken by a number of the members of staff in the current situation is a valid point of view, in the circumstances of this case I am satisfied that it is contrary to the clearly expressed view of P before she lost capacity."Within this context, he was satisfied that the presumption in favour of living should give way to P's strongly held views prior to her becoming incapacitated, that she would not wish to be kept alive in her "current parlous condition".



## Sophie Toscan du Plantier Murder: Court Convicts Ian Bailey in His Absence

A former journalist has been convicted of the murder of a French film producer in Ireland more than 20 years ago. A court in Paris convicted Ian Bailey, who is originally from Manchester, in absentia for the murder of Sophie Toscan du Plantier. The 62-year-old, with an address at the Prairie, Toormore, County Cork, has been sentenced to 25 years in prison.

His solicitor, Frank Buttimer, said the decision was a "grotesque miscarriage of justice". The trial lasted three days. Irish authorities have twice refused to extradite Bailey. He has repeatedly denied any involvement in the killing, and his lawyers dismissed the proceedings in France as a "show trial".

Ms Toscan du Plantier was assaulted near a holiday home her husband had bought near Schull in west County Cork more than 22 years ago. Her badly beaten body was discovered by neighbours in a laneway near the house on 23 December 1996. During the trial, judges were shown photographs of the blood-stained rock and concrete block which were found close to the victim's body. The court was also told that her house revealed no signs of the presence of an intruder. It is believed she opened the door to her killer. There was no jury in the trial and the three judges took about five hours to reach a verdict.

Speaking to Irish national broadcaster RTÉ, Mr Buttimer, Bailey's defence solicitor, said it was not a criminal trial or carried out in the way it would be in the Republic of Ireland. He claimed it was no more than "a rubber-stamping exercise" of "the pre-determined guilt" of Mr Bailey "as far as the French criminal justice system is concerned". Nobody has ever been charged in Ireland in connection with Ms Toscan du Plantier's death. Bailey, who lived three kilometres from her, was twice arrested for questioning by gardaí (Irish police) but released without charge. As he was not present in court for the French proceedings, Bailey cannot appeal the verdict. However, under French law, anyone found guilty of a crime in absentia is entitled to a second trial in France where they will be present in court and represented by defence lawyers.French authorities will now request his extradition for a third time.

## Northern Ireland Judge Rebukes Police For Seizing Papers From Journalists

Documents linked to investigation into 1994 massacre must be returned to Trevor Birney and Barry McCaffrey. Rory Carroll, Guardian: Northern Ireland's top judge has delivered a stinging rebuke to police for raiding the homes and offices of two journalists who investigated a notorious – still unresolved – massacre during the Troubles. The lord chief justice of Northern Ireland, Declan Morgan, said on Friday that police had obtained "inappropriate" search warrants, and ordered them to return laptops, phones, documents and other material seized from Trevor Birney and Barry McCaffrey. The judge vindicated the journalists, saying they had acted in "perfectly proper manner" in protecting their sources for the documentary No Stone Unturned, which investigated the June 1994 murder of six Catholics in Loughinisland, County Down, by Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) gunmen.

Birney and McCaffrey embraced their lawyers and supporters and called the judge's decision a huge relief. "Today restores our faith in the checks and balances of the court system," Birney said outside the high court in Belfast. "It's a damning indictment of the police investigation." Seamus Dooley, the assistant secretary general of the National Union of Journalists, hailed the judge's decision. "It's a good day for journalism and a good day for human rights in Northern Ireland," he said. No one has been charged for the atrocity at Loughinisland, where three masked gunmen entered the Heights pub and opened fire on customers watching the Republic of Ireland play Italy in the World Cup. The oldest to die was Barney Greene, 87. The youngest was Adrian Rogan, 34.

The 2017 documentary, directed by Oscar-winning director Alex Gibney, reconstructed the attack and the police investigation, named the main suspects and questioned murky contacts between

police and loyalist paramilitaries. Rather than follow up leads in the documentary, police targeted the journalists. They arrested Birney and McCaffrey in dawn raids last August on suspicion of stealing an unredacted police ombudsman investigation into the massacre. The pair, who have remained on bail without charge, challenged the legality of the search warrants in a judicial review.

Sir Declan Morgan signalled his decision at a hearing on Wednesday when he said the court was "minded to quash the warrants on the basis they were inappropriate". On Friday, he repeated that the warrants were inappropriate and absolved the journalists. "The material … [it] was subsequently demonstrated to us, does not indicate that the journalists acted in anything other than a perfectly proper manner with a view to protecting their sources in a lawful way. We consider that in any event in the light of the legal authorities that the execution or granting of the search warrant was inappropriate." The judge said the seized material, which includes millions of pages of documents, should be returned. He said the journalists should retain Loughinisland material of potential interest to the police. The pair remain under investigation pending a police decision to continue or drop the case.

Niall Murphy, a solicitor for the men, said evidence presented this week had exposed the "warped mindset" of police who pursued journalists rather than murderers. "Senior police must now reflect on their actions and and stop this farce of an investigation." The raids against the men were overseen by officers from Durham constabulary, after they were asked to take over the case by the Police Service of Northern Ireland due to a potential conflict of interest. Chief Constable Mike Barton, from Durham Constabulary, said in a statement on Friday that due process was followed in applying for the warrants. "We respect the outcome of today's hearing and the judge's decision, and we will consider its implications," he said. Barton is due to accompany the PSNI chief constable George Hamilton at a meeting of the Northern Ireland policing board on 6 June.

The case has become a cause célèbre among press freedom campaigners, who have drawn comparisons with the UK government's attempts to encourage journalistic freedoms overseas. It has also created unusual alliances. The journalists' legal team includes John Finucane, a solicitor and Sinn Féin councillor who was recently elected lord mayor of Belfast. A high-profile political supporter is David Davis, the Conservative MP and former Brexit minister, who is a veteran campaigner for press freedom. After attending the hearings on Wednesday and Friday, Davis commended the judge for upholding press freedom. "You could hardly ask for a better judgment," he said. McCaffrey thanked the Tory for swapping Westminster for Belfast to show his solidarity. "If there's one person that went above and beyond, it's David Davis."

### Courts Uphold Strict Interpretation of Immigration Rules

Gherson Immigration: Following the recent Court of Appeal decision in R (Sajjad) v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 720, which demonstrated the lack of flexibility in the current Immigration Rules ("the Rules") with respect to the requirements for Tier 1 (Entrepreneur) Migrant status, the High Court has now also confirmed that the Rules should be interpreted strictly "to allow officials in the department to essentially 'tick boxes' in relation to any application and if a box cannot be ticked, for example because the required evidence has not been provided, then to reject the application".

In the case of R (Khajuria) v SSHD [2019] EWHC 1226, the Claimant applied for an extension of her leave to remain in the UK together with her husband and two children as a Tier 1 (Entrepreneur) Migrant and PBS dependants respectively. The Claimant operated a hospitality business in the UK, and for the purposes of her extension application relied on part-time employees who were paid less than £116 per week. As the employees' salary was below a particular minimum threshold, the



Claimant's company was not required to register for PAYE and provide Real Time Information ("RTI") to HMRC as confirmed by the PAYE and payroll guidance for employers.

However, the Rules state that a person applying for further leave to remain in the UK as a Tier 1 (Entrepreneur) Migrant must score 20 points for job creation (out of the 95 points required), by providing all specified documents listed in paragraph 50 of Appendix A, including "(a) printouts of Real Time Full Payment Submissions showing that the applicant complied with Pay As You Earn (PAYE) reporting requirements to HM Revenue & Customs in respect of each relevant settled worker as legally required, and has done so for the full period of employment used to claim points".

Although the Claimant created the required jobs, the Home Office refused her extension application because she did not submit RTIs. The Claimant then issued Judicial Review proceedings against the Home Offices arguing that: 1. The requirement of the Rules to submit RTIs was "partial and unequal" between applicants who operate businesses that are required to produce RTIs to the HMRC and those like her, which do not have to register for PAYE and provide RTIs. She argued that such a requirement was therefore unlawful; and 2. In any event, if this requirement was not unlawful, the Home Office should have considered exercising discretion, especially after learning the reasons why the RTIs were not submitted.

The High Court dismissed the Claimant's arguments and held that: "…although the rule operates in such a way that someone in the position of this Claimant cannot comply with it because she does not operate a PAYE system which involves submission of RTI, that does not make the rule invalid". Furthermore, the court held that: "…there is no discretion to dispense with the evidential requirement to supply RTI information to an applicant within the rules".

This decision yet again demonstrates that currently the courts support the Home Office's 'tick box' approach to the consideration of Entrepreneur applications. With this visa route having been closed to new applicants as of 29 March 2019, the remaining entrepreneurs (who have until 6 April 2023 to apply for further leave to remain in the UK and until 6 April 2025 to apply for indefinite leave to remain) should make sure that any documents they provide to the Home Office with their applications meet all the requirements of the Immigration Rules, as no discretion will be exercised.

### The Case For Anonymity

Simon Warr, The War Zone: Last Thursday, as I watched singer-songwriter and founding member of the pop combo JLS, Oritsé Williams, walking from Wolverhampton Crown Court, having just been cleared by a unanimous jury of having raped a woman in a hotel bedroom in December 2016, I had a good idea of how he was feeling. Relief would be his principal emotion; relief that he wasn't going to spend years of his comparatively young life behind bars, confined in a prison within a prison – a special area reserved for that most hated category of the prison population: sex offenders. But the relief will probably not last for long because Mr. Williams, an innocent man, will then have to adjust to a life inextricably linked with the story of how he was once accused of rape.

The fact that he was cleared of this heinous accusation will help him somewhat but even this 'not guilty' verdict is still likely to cause him unjust pain for the rest of his life. Just being accused of a sex offence is catastrophic for any person so targeted. Recognising the inevitable serious damage caused, the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 extended anonymity to suspects in such cases prior to a conviction. However, since that protection was repealed in 1988, the law has allowed an accused person's name to be made public – with a few limited exceptions – and the living experience of hundreds of innocent people has been made tortuous, while the law-makers don't seem to give a damn.

Sex offences are viewed throughout our society here in the UK as a crimen exceptum and they carry a particular stigma. I, myself, was accused by a pair of lying opportunists in 2012 of having 'touched them inappropriately' in the school shower room, when I was a teacher at the school where they were pupils, back in the early 1980s. Their lies were seen for what they were by a unanimous jury in a matter of minutes, but only after I had spent 672 days on bail in the full ghastly glare of publicity. There was not a scintilla of truth in what they had claimed but, nevertheless, those preposterous claims, apart from destroying a highly successful teaching career, will be linked to me for the rest of my life due to the indelible online footprint. While I live with references to these false allegations for evermore, my perfidious accusers can continue their own lives with both anonymity and impunity. Is this fair?

It is almost impossible to convey the deep feelings of humiliation and depression an accused person feels when he or she reads reports in the press, or comments by the untutored mob circulating on the net, about what he or she was alleged to have done, even many years ago. There used to be a saying that 'today's newspaper stories are tomorrow's fish-and-chip wrapping paper'. Since the birth of the internet, this is no longer the case. Two hundred years ago, criminals would have been branded on their foreheads. Nowadays, the internet does the branding just as effectively but the difference is, as Mr. Williams will find, you don't even need to be guilty of a crime to be seared for life. For the baying mob on the Net and nervous prospective employers, an accusation is enough to damage seriously an accused person's life even after an acquittal. Once Pandora's box has been opened, no one and nothing can re-close the lid.

Work that would have been coming Mr. Williams' way will be diverted elsewhere; comments will be made behind his back that 'there's no smoke without fire' and there will be the predictable vile comments issuing from the keyboards of those malicious trolls on the net, who will enthusiastically offer their opinions as to why he should have been found guilty and locked up at the very least. Whenever anyone 'googles' Mr. Williams' name, instead of immediately finding references to all the splendid songs he wrote and performed for our immense pleasure, at the top of the search engine findings there will be multiple references to the fact 'Oritse Williams has appeared in a court of law, charged with raping a young woman'. He'll never escape his connection with this alleged crime and his descendants will have to bat off comments even after he has joined the choir invisible.

In short, although an innocent man, Mr. Williams, talented musician and performer, is inextricably linked to the repellent topic of rape for the rest of his life. In the eyes of the public, there are few more heinous crimes than sexual assault, which makes it imperative that anyone accused of such a crime should remain anonymous until he or she is found guilty in a court of law. The argument against this is some people believe that, by concealing the identity of the accused, it will make it harder for the complainant to secure justice, as he or she might be a lone voice in a court of law, while other victims of the same defendant remain unaware that he or she is on trial.

I would argue that - if the evidence is strong enough - a jury will convict even on a single charge and, once the offender is found guilty, his or her name will be widely reported. Then, if there other victims, they can step forward if that is their wish. Besides which, even if an accused person is granted anonymity until a court verdict, those who live locally to him or her are likely to hear about the complaint by word of mouth as soon as the person is arrested.

The questions are as follows: i) are we prepared to continue to ruin innocent people's lives in order to give support to complainants, on the chance there might be others who have suffered at the hands of the accused? ii) are these innocent, unconvicted people just collateral damage in our desire to make it as easy as possible to have real culprits brought to justice? Besides which, there are obvious dangers in the common police practice of trawling, and advertising, for fresh complainants to step forward, particularly in a country which hands out enormous amounts of money in compensation to those claiming abuse.



I'm calling for a statutory ban on identifying sexual offence suspects until they are found guilty in a court of law. We bang on about human rights and the rights to privacy in this country ad nauseam, yet we seem to pay little respect to so many innocent people who are having their lives turned upside down, in the full glare of publicity, by false sexual allegations.

The unjust, abhorrent police practice of the 'fly paper' technique has to stop. I refer to the common m.o. of the police of arresting someone, leaking the person's identity to the press, endlessly re-bailing him or her, all in a bid to secure more complainants (where there's no 'quality' evidence, the police endeavour to make up for it in 'quantity' so-called evidence). The damage to the accused is both cruel and irreparable.

If a judge feels a suspect could well be responsible for multiple offences, then, on a case by case basis, that judge can make a decision to have the accused person's identity disclosed, as sometimes happens with children who have been accused of a heinous crime.

Few MPs take an interest in the unedifying topic of false sexual allegations and anonymity for the person accused, as it's unlikely to secure for them many votes. Far better to keep to campaigning about issues such as the inordinate number of pot holes in our roads: much safer ground (if you'll excuse the pun). Nevertheless, publication of an innocent person's name in relation to a sexual allegation is catastrophic for the person concerned, as poor Mr. Oritsé Williams knows all too well. It's an issue which needs to be attended to before even more innocent people have their lives utterly ruined through no fault of their own.

### Continued Use of Taser on Autistic Male Disproportionate

Tom Crowther QC: In Gilchrist v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [2019] EWHC 1233, the High Court considered officers' use of force in the context of use of CS gas and a taser repeatedly upon a man who was autistic and mentally distressed and found that its continued use became unlawful. Whereas the initial use of CS gas and Taser were justified, once the police learned of the male's vulnerability as an autistic man and noted that his behaviour was defensive rather than aggressive, a more cautious approach should have been adopted.

On 6th June 2014 at 05:56, an emergency call reported a man, naked from the waist up and covered in blood, shouting in the street. At 05:59 an ambulance was called; it was estimated it would take 7 minutes to arrive. At 06:01, two police officers arrived in a van. One of those officers ("A") sprayed the claimant with CS gas. At 06:02, another officer ("B") arrived and used his taser on the claimant: a single taser discharge with two cycles of 4 and 2 seconds. This was ineffective and "A" used his gas again. At 06:03 yet another officer ("C") arrived and used his taser on the claimant: two discharges with cycles of 7, 5 and 2 seconds and 29, 5, 6 13 and 8 seconds; the final cycle being applied when the claimant had been taken to the ground.

The claimant's case was that the police's use of force was unnecessary; the defendant's that the claimant was suffering from an episode of mental illness which caused him to behave aggressively, that it was necessary for the police to control him, and that the methods employed were reasonable and proportionate.

Judgment: The judge heard evidence from family members, one of whom accepted it was "fair enough" to describe the complainant as aggressive when the police officers arrived; another said the complainant had blood on his hands. His fist was clenched and he appeared to be holding some-

thing. There was evidence the claimant had banged his fists on the police van. Neither of the initially attending officers regarded the complainant as a threat to them; each suspected given his demeanour and bloodied appearance that he had committed an offence. Officer "A" took the view that the claimant needed to be stopped so as to find out what had happened. He spoke to the claimant who approached him; the officer felt vulnerable and used his CS spray from a distance of 15 feet away. It was "A"'s first career use of CS. The judge found this was justifiable and reasonable use of force. As a matter of fact, the CS was ineffective.

Officer "B" arrived at 06:02. He found the claimant to be moving to and away from the initially attending officers while making grunting noises. He seemed odd and unpredictable, "working himself up to something". The officer characterized the complainant's behaviour as aggressive but could not attribute the behaviour to intoxication, mental distress or a response to having committed a crime. The officer did not know that CS gas had been used. He was concerned for his fellow officers and also took the view that the complainant needed to be detained. The claimant had something in his right hand, and when he turned to officer "B" from a distance of 4 to 5 feet the officer regarded this as an escalation and used his taser, cycling it twice but curtailing each of the two 5 second cycles. He had never used a taser before. The taser was ineffective, and the officer noted that the second probe had not remained attached to the claimant's body. The judge held his was a justifiable and reasonable use of the taser to attempt to control the claimant and prevent him causing harm to himself or anyone else.

"A" had gassed the claimant again. He said that he had been aware of the risk of flammability where tasers were deployed but knew the taser had not properly connected with the claimant and saw that it had been ineffective. He did not attempt physical contact at that stage having seen the claimant had something in his hand. Having seen the CS fail twice, "B" decided not to deploy his taser again because of the flammability risks and its previous failure to subdue the claimant. The judge found that this was a very challenging situation and that "A"'s decision had to be made very quickly. It was reasonable and justifiable in those circumstances to use CS again.

The attending officers had recorded on the force wide incident number system at 06:02 that there was the possibility that the claimant had harmed his wrists; and at 06:03 that he had been tasered twice. Within a minute or so they knew the claimant's name from family members on the scene and they knew he had mental health difficulties.

Officer "C" arrived at about 06:03. He had used a taser on many previous occasions. "B" told him immediately that the claimant had been sprayed with CS. "C" knew that the claimant had been sprayed and tasered; he said he thought that the claimant had "swung at" the officers. He was 2 metres away and thought the taser could be effective in preventing harm coming to the other officers. He discharged the device and the probe connected but there was no sign it was effective - the claimant was upright, his eyes were bulging and he was frothing at the mouth. He reloaded the taser and discharged again, keeping the taser cycling, then used the device in angled drive mode into the claimant's upper back for a 13 second cycle. "C" said the claimant tried to swing at him while he applied the taser directly to the claimant's back. Another officer arrived and took the claimant to the ground and while he was prone "C" used his taser again.

The judge held that "C"'s decision that the claimant was violent and needed to be detained was honestly made and reasonable. She went on to find, however, that there were a number of reasons which militated against the multiple and prolonged cycling of the device as being reasonable or justified: namely, first, that the claimant was known then to be a vulnerable person; second, his behaviour with the police since their attendance had not given cause to



think an attack would be imminent; third, the claimant was moving slowly and there was time to step back; fourth, "C" knew that CS had been recently used; fifth, he also knew that taser had previously been ineffective; sixth, the final use of the taser while the claimant was on the ground was unjustified and served only to inflict unnecessary pain. It is noteworthy that whereas in the case of McCarthy v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police [2016] EWCA Civ 1257, the individual on whom the Taser was used was aggressive, in the instant case the court found that the behaviour of the claimant was defensive.

Commentary: The claim was in trespass to the person and in negligence. Familiarly, s.3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 provides that "a person may use such force as it reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders" and s.117 of Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 that an officer may use reasonable force in exercising powers under the Act. An officer using force is under a duty to avoid causing reasonably foreseeable personal injury: Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [2018] UKSC 4; [2018] AC 736. There may of course be circumstances which justify the taking of risks to the safety of the public. The Courts have emphasized that the duty on an officer is a duty to take such care as is reasonable in all the circumstances (per Lord Hughes in Robinson at para 76): unrealistically demanding standards should not be applied to officers required to take immediate critical decisions in stressful circumstances.

The Operational Use of Taser Policy Document (set out in the judgment at para 52) sets out the purpose of use "to temporarily incapacitate an individual in order to control and neutralise the threat they pose. It is not to be used to inflict severe pain or suffering on another in the performance or purported performance of official duties" (section 1.1) and the effects "The device relies on physiological effects other than pain alone to achieve its objective, although pain is the main factor when used in stun drive mode" (section 2.2). The advice notes that a taser may not be immediately effective and in such circumstances the policy document proposes "Whilst the 5 second cycle can be repeated if the incapacitation effect does not appear to take effect, officers should consider other options, as there may be technical or physiological reasons why the device is not working as expected on a particular individual." Further, it goes on to caution that a taser should not be used where it has been previously employed without success, or where there is a risk of flammability - including where a person has been sprayed with CS gas.

The College of Policing has given specific guidance for taser-equipped officers dealing with vulnerable people, and notes "If information and intelligence reveals the presence of a factor which can influence behaviour and alter response, police should take this into account when considering their approach. Officers must be aware of how their presence and tactics might be interpreted by the subject. It is important, however, that the basic principles of tactics are complied with in order to reduce the potential threat by and/or to the subject as soon as practicable. The following actions can help create opportunities for the subject and officers to have more time and space to defuse the situation: be prepared to back off; use of effective cover; give space and time if possible; early negotiation; evacuate immediate area."

The Guidance further states that on an officer's using a taser, "the cycle can be repeated or extended if the desired incapacitation does not appear to take effect and the further use of force is justified and proportionate in the circumstances". A discharge cycle is 5 seconds by default and can only be extended by the officer keeping pressure on the trigger; in contrast to "B", who cut short each of the two cycles he delivered, "C" discharged his device for a total of 72 seconds over two cartridges, one cycle being just a second short of half a minute, and

the final two cycles being a drive stun contact and a cycle when the claimant had been restrained. Officers are of course trained that their use of any force, including taser cycle, must be proportionate, lawful, accountable and necessary.

To return to the judgment, therefore, these cases are notoriously fact-specific; this case does not lay down any point of principle but it does provide some useful illustration of the way the courts approach these matters. Just as juries in criminal cases are routinely warned that a person who genuinely believes themselves to be under attack cannot be expected to weigh to a nicety force used in reply, the civil courts will not expect superhuman levels of phlegm or logical analysis from officers in supremely difficult situations.

Here, however, "C" arrived after the other officers. He knew more about the claimant than had his colleagues when they arrived: he knew both that the claimant had been subjected to CS and to taser and that he was autistic and vulnerable. The claimant had not harmed the other officers and "C" did not suggest he thought they had. It is understandable that the judge found "C"'s decision to use his taser was inappropriate in the circumstances.

In this case, "C" appears to have failed properly to consider the circumstances on his arrival, to have failed appropriately to consider whether his use of the taser was justified at all, and to have failed to consider whether his continued use of the device was serving a justified purpose. If a taser case is different from a baton case or a spray case, it is that the device itself by default delivers a measured dose of force. The more repeated the application of such a dose, the more difficult it will be for any officer to, in the apt words of Hallett LJ in McCarthy v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police [2016] EWCA Civ 1257, "justify the battery".

**Boris Johnson's Ramblings About Prisoners and Spa Breaks Divorced From Reality.**

The Secret Barrister: Taking a swipe at "our cock-eyed crook-coddling criminal justice system", Mr Johnson alighted upon a story, reported by outlets including the Telegraph, concerning a convicted drug dealer called Luke Jewitt. Mr Jewitt was sentenced to imprisonment in 2014 for his involvement in a multi-million-pound conspiracy to import or supply cocaine, only to be released to enjoy a "luxury spa break" with his mother before his sentence had been served. According to the Telegraph, "He is believed to have spent the day at the Santai Spa in Birmingham for Mother's Day, at the end of March. The spa boasts an outdoor jacuzzi with lake views, salt cave and mosaic hot-stone loungers. Packages at the luxury venue cost up to £140 per day."

There is no suggestion that this was paid for by anyone other than Mr Jewitt; rather outrage is invited at the notion of a prisoner being released early, which, the writer assures us, "is becoming more and more regular". As the headline has it, "Letting drug dealers out of prison to go on spa breaks is criminally stupid". Unfortunately, in making this argument Mr Johnson's characteristic fidelity to facts and detail abandons him. Let's see if we can reacquaint them.

Luke Jewitt was sentenced in 2014. The precise sentence he received is unclear. If you believe The Telegraph (left), it was 10 years' imprisonment. If you believe Boris Johnson writing in The Telegraph (right), it was nine years. But either way, at something approaching the halfway point of his sentence, he was released on temporary licence (or "let out on day release", in the tabloid argot), during which time he attended the aforementioned spa. Mr Johnson's apoplexy is untrammelled: Not merely a jacuzzi, dear readers, but a visit to the National Sea Life Centre. Is nothing sacred?

From this starting point, Mr Johnson lines up a medley of propositions. Some highlights are below. In summary: Drug dealing causes untold misery (undoubtedly true); Prisons are



at once too ghastly and too cushy (the record rates of violence, death, suicide and self-harm cast a degree of doubt on the latter); We need to be "tough" on those who carry knives (standard political fare, with the standard blank space when it comes to offering a practical working definition of what being "tough" should entail).

We are then offered the writer's considered views on the thorny issue of stop and search. Fortunately, contrary to research suggesting that stop and search is deployed in a racially discriminatory manner, Mr Johnson reassures us that it, in fact, isn't. He is not able to offer any evidence for this claim, but his word is surely his bond.

As for his primary concern, the early release of offenders, Mr Johnson has identified the culprits: it is the "politically correct" Parole Board, responsible for endangering public safety by licensing rapists to reoffend and drug kingpins to purify and replenish with naturally detoxifying algae leaving the skin looking refined, toned and beautifully radiant. The release of Luke Jewitt, Johnson posits in a puddle of consciousness, is an example of the "need to root out the Leftist culture of so much of the criminal justice establishment."

There are a few problems with this thesis. Firstly, the case "earlier this month" to which Mr Johnson refers involving "the convicted rapist out on early release", who "allegedly commit several more rapes immediately". Assuming that this is the case which has made headlines (and about which we must be cautious due to criminal proceedings now being live), the man involved was not a convicted rapist, but a burglar. And this was not a case in which the Parole Board had directed his release; rather it was reported that due to an administrative error, he was released by the prison having erroneously bypassed the Parole Board. To lay this at the Parole Board's door is, to quote Mary Whitehouse (probably), pretty fucking dishonest.

But beyond this mangled non-example, the foundation of Johnson's argument betrays a woeful ignorance of the entire subject matter. He seems to be under the impression that a prisoner's release is always governed by the Parole Board. It's not. For the vast majority of prisoners serving a standard determinate sentence, release on licence is automatic once you've served half of your prison sentence. I've blogged before on this, as it's frequently misunderstood.

Parole Boards tend to focus their attentions on dangerous prisoners, including those sentenced to life imprisonment or to other types of sentence for which release is not automatic, such as now-abolished imprisonment for public protection (IPP), or "extended sentences" imposed on a dangerous offenders. In order to be released from such sentences, a prisoner has to persuade the Parole Board that his incarceration is longer necessary for the protection of the public. Now Parole Boards are far from perfect; the case last year of John Worboys gave a troubling insight into the errors that plagued the Parole Board's decision to direct his release, and it would be naive to conclude that this is an isolated case. No doubt errors occur, and quite possibly more frequently than we perhaps wish to imagine. However, Johnson's claim that "It is becoming more and more regular for prisoners to be let out early – even when they have been convicted of the most serious and violent crimes" is accompanied by absolutely no evidence whatsoever. Indeed, if we were trading in boring facts, we might observe that England & Wales has more prisoners serving indeterminate and life sentences than any other country in Europe, suggesting that neither courts nor Parole Boards are overly eager on the frivolous release of dangerous prisoners. But the assertion that there is a recent acceleration in the release of dangerous offenders is simply that. There is not even a whiff of evidence tendered in support.

But back to drug lords, and other prisoners whose release is not dependent on the approval of the Parole Board. They are all entitled to automatic release at the halfway point of their sentence, and as they approach that point can be entitled to release on temporary licence

(ROTL), subject to a risk assessment. It is this scheme which Johnson describes as "criminally stupid". Letting prisoners out for the odd day here and there – what possible good can it do? Well, quite a lot, the evidence suggests. A recent government report – a government of which Mr Johnson was, until toys exeunted the pram, a member – concluded that the analysis was is "consistent with the conclusion that ROTL reduces reoffending". So even if the notion of somebody serving a few days' less on their sentence fills you with righteous indignation, the evidence that it makes us all a little safer is a fairly important fact to omit from an honest discussion.

That all said, there remains an understandable public bugbear when it comes to the concept of automatic release at the halfway stage of a prison sentence. I've written about this in my book. The public hear or read "10 years", and feel justifiably deceived when they discover that 10 means 5 (minus any time already served on remand awaiting trial or sentence). Now there are reasons as to why we grant automatic release halfway through a sentence. One reason is that this mechanism saves the government money, gifting them the tabloid headlines of long prison sentences without the Treasury having to actually pay for them. Less cynically, it is also argued that it helps reintegrate prisoners into society and aids rehabilitation. If they reoffend on licence, they can be recalled to serve the remainder of their sentence.

But let's park that debate to one side. Instead, let's ask why we have automatic halfway release at all? Which MPs were in Parliament when such a thing was introduced? Well, automatic release at the halfway stage of all determinate sentences has been a fixture since the enactment of section 244 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Present in Parliament as an MP when this legislation passed was one Boris Johnson. Can you guess how many impassioned speeches he gave in the Commons against the "criminally stupid" idea of automatically releasing prisoners early? In fact, how many times has he ever spoken in Parliament about early release, or the Parole Board, or release on temporary licence?

From wherever springs this yearning to draw public attention to the horrors of early release on licence, it has lain dormant for a good sixteen years. Heaven forfend that this newly-discovered zeal for making the lives of prisoners more miserable and antagonistic baiting of "politically correct" and "left wing" criminal justice is merely the latest exploit of a populist charlatan tossing bucketfulls of cheap fatty red meat to the Party Faithful just as a certain job opening emerges.

### Court of Appeal: Draft Judgments Not an "Invitation to Treat"

Nick Hilborne, Litigation Futures: Receiving a judge's draft judgment is not an "invitation to treat", nor is it an opportunity to critique the ruling, enter into negotiations or reargue the case, the Court of Appeal has made clear. Ruling in a family case likely to be read across to civil and criminal matters, Lady Justice King said requests for clarification had "become commonplace" in children and family cases, and on occasion could be "frankly confrontational and disrespectful in tone". King LJ said it was "neither necessary nor appropriate" for the Court of Appeal to "seek to identify any bright line or to provide guidelines as to the limits of the appropriate nature or extent of clarification which may properly be sought" in children or financial remedy cases. "I would merely remind practitioners that receiving a judge's draft judgment is not an 'invitation to treat', nor is it an opportunity to critique the judgment or to enter into negotiations with the judge as to the outcome or to reargue the case in an attempt to water down unpalatable findings." The judge said requests for clarification "should not be routine" and only be made in accordance with a 2012 practice note relating to family proceedings, in other words "to raise with the judge and draw to his attention any material omission in the judgment, any genuine query or ambiguity which arises on the judgment, and any perceived lack of reasons or other perceived deficiency in the judge's reasoning process".

Delivering judgment in I (Children) [2019] EWCA Civ 898, King LJ said the question was where the line was drawn between reasonable and appropriate requests for amplification and attempts to reargue the case. "Judgments in care cases are often given by a judge under immense time pressure whether extemporary or reserved. It is right that issues of the type identified in the practice note should be raised with the judge if appropriate and, in so doing, avoid the necessity of an appeal and therefore further delay for the child the subject of care proceedings."

However, King LJ said Rex Howling QC, counsel for the baby's mother, "confirmed the perception of this court that requests for extensive clarification, going well beyond the perimeters identified in the authorities, have become commonplace in both children and financial remedy cases in the family court". King LJ said: "It has become, as we understand it, almost routine for a draft judgment to be followed up with extensive requests for 'clarification' which in many cases can be regarded as nothing other than an attempt to reargue the case or, as here, water down the judge's judgment; successfully in this case." The judge said Mr Howling had been "helpful and pragmatic in all his submissions, while the request for clarification submitted by him is by no means the most excessive the court has seen, it is, in my judgment, on the wrong side of the line". King LJ went on: "The family court is overwhelmed with care cases. Judges at all levels often move seamlessly from one trial to the next without judgment writing time between them. "Routine requests for clarification running to a number of pages are not only ordinarily inappropriate, but hugely burdensome on the judges who have, weeks later, to revisit the evidence and their judgment when their thoughts and concerns have long since moved onto other cases. This is not conducive to the interests of justice."

### Double Prosecution and Double Conviction Violaion of the Convention

In Chamber judgment in the case of Nodet v. France (application no. 47342/14) the European Court of Human Rights held, unanimously, that there had been: a violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 (right not to be tried or punished twice) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The case concerned the right not to be tried or punished twice (ne bis in idem). The applicant, a financial analyst, was fined by the financial markets regulator, the AMF, for manipulation of a share price, and subsequently by criminal courts for the offence of obstructing the proper operation of the stock market by the same action. He complained that he had been punished twice for the same offence. The Court observed, first, that there was no sufficiently close connection in substance between the two sets of proceedings, of the AMF and of the criminal courts, in view of the purposes pursued and given, to some extent, the repetition in the gathering of evidence by various investigators; secondly, and above all, there was no sufficiently close connection in time for the proceedings to be considered part of an integrated mechanism of sanctions prescribed by French law. It concluded that Mr Nodet had sustained disproportionate damage on account of his double prosecution and the double conviction, by the AMF and the criminal courts, for the same facts.

Hostages: Naweed Ali, Khobaib Hussain, Mohibur Rahman, Tahir Aziz, Roger Khan, Wang Yam, Andrew Malkinson, Michael Ross, Mark Alexander, Anis Sardar, Jamie Green, Dan Payne, Zoran Dresic, Scott Birtwistle, Jon Beere, Chedwyn Evans, Darren Waterhouse, David Norris, Brendan McConville, John Paul Wooton, John Keelan, Mohammed Niaz Khan, Abid Ashiq Hussain, Sharaz Yaqub, David Ferguson, Anthony Parsons, James Cullinene, Stephen Marsh, Graham Coutts, Royston Moore, Duane King,
Leon Chapman, Tony Marshall, Anthony Jackson, David Kent, Norman Grant, Ricardo Morrison, Alex Silva,Terry Smith, Hyrone Hart, Glen Cameron,Warren Slaney, Melvyn 'Adie' McLellan, Lyndon Coles, Robert Bradley, John Twomey, Thomas G. Bourke, David E. Ferguson, Lee Mockble, George Coleman, Neil Hurley, Jaslyn Ricardo Smith, James Dowsett, Kevan & Miran Thakrar, Jordan Towers, Patrick Docherty, Brendan Dixon, Paul Bush, Alex Black, Nicholas Rose, Kevin Nunn, Peter Carine, Paul Higginson, Robert Knapp, Thomas Petch, Vincent and Sean Bradish, John Allen, Jeremy Bamber, Kevin Lane, Michael Brown, Robert Knapp, William Kenealy, Glyn Razzell, Willie Gage, Kate Keaveney, Michael Stone, Michael Attwooll, John Roden, Nick Tucker, Karl Watson, Terry Allen, Richard Southern, Jamil Chowdhary, Jake Mawhinney, Peter Hannigan.