

'Chemically Burned at the Stake':- Execution of a Man Who Killed No One

Lucy Anna Gray, Independent: Nathaniel Woods was pronounced dead at 9.01pm on Thursday 5th March 2020. He was killed by lethal injection in Alabama, one of 29 American states that still has the death penalty. The 43-year-old was convicted 15 years ago for being involved in the death of three police officers, all of whom were shot by Kerry Spencer. Officers Carlos Owen, Harley Chisolm and Charles Bennett died at a drug house while serving a misdemeanour domestic assault warrant. Woods was accused of setting up the ambush that led to their deaths in 2004.

Chisolm's sister called the governor of Alabama, Kay Ivey, in a bid to stop the execution. "I do not think that Nathaniel is guilty of murder," a statement from her said, according to Woods' lawyer. "Please do not move forward with the hasty decision to execute Nathaniel. My conscience will not let me live with this if he dies. I beg you to have mercy on him." Many have pointed out repeat failings in the case of Nathaniel Woods who – although he pulled no trigger – was killed by the state. His story has gained traction around the world, with celebrities such as Kim Kardashian and Martin Luther King III decrying the decision.

"Woods, a black man, was sentenced to death even though even the prosecutors in his case agreed he did not personally kill anyone," Cassandra Stubbs, director of the Capital Punishment Project at ACLU, tells *The Independent*. "He was sentenced to death despite the fact that two of the jurors rejected a death sentence ... Woods was repeatedly denied the quality of counsel that could and should have saved his life." Alabama is the only US state where you can be sentenced to death if jurors don't agree a verdict.

This is by no means an isolated incident. Since 1976, 1,515 people have died by the death penalty in America, and since 1973, more than 165 people have been released from death row with evidence of innocence. In certain US states a person can be sent to death row for commissioning or being an accomplice to a crime. "If you pick me up and we drive to a gas station and I go in and shoot the convenience person and get back in your car and you drive away, you can be held just as accountable for the murder of that person as I can," Gregory Joseph of the National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty (NCADP) tells us.

Out of those 1,515 deaths, 1,337 have been by lethal injection. Several death row inmates in the US have opted for the electric chair over the infamous drug cocktail, the latter notorious for being a potentially horrific way to die. The lethal injection – a combination of three drugs – has been widely condemned, with no American pharmaceutical companies willing to supply the drugs. Robert Dunham, executive director of non-profit Death Penalty Information Centre – that is neither for or against capital punishment – explains to us how the lethal injection kills someone. After decades of using gas chambers, hanging and the electric chair, states sought a less "gruesome" way to execute people, Dunham says, the thinking being it would be a "simple medical procedure where someone goes to sleep".

"Studies now show this three drug process is the equivalent to waterboarding, suffocation and being chemically burned at the stake," Dunham says. "The people who developed the drug weren't aware of what it actually did to a person. It wasn't developed by a doctor." The first stage of the typical three-drug protocol is to sedate the restrained prisoner; Midazolam

being the current drug of choice. Next comes a drug such as rocuronium bromide to paralyse the muscles, then potassium chloride to stop the heart. At one point during the execution of Woods he jerked his left arm upward against his restraints before his breathing slowed and eventually stopped, according to the Associated Press.

"Midazolam is not an inappropriate drug to be used for execution purposes," Dunham says. "It's a perfectly good medical drug, but it does not have the properties that would knock a prisoner out and keep them sedated so they don't feel the effects of the other drugs." And what are those effects? "You are drowning. You are aware of the fluid buildup and you are aware of the inability to get air in and expel the fluid," Dunham says. "And while that happens you are being chemically burned – a chemical fire – and the combination of those things resulting in an extended period of a torturous death."

As no pharmaceutical companies in America are willing to sell their medicines for the use of executions, states have had to find alternative means of acquiring them. For example, Ohio allegedly ordered Midazolam through its mental health department, then went on to transfer it to the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, where the state's death chamber is located. Or in the case of Nevada, where the pharmaceutical company Alvogen sued over claims their drug was supplied to the prison illegally.

Woods was the first person to be executed in Alabama this year. There are currently 173 inmates on death row in the state. "Governor Ivey in Alabama has moved forward with all the executions that have come across her desk," Joseph says. "She even authorised the execution of two people last year and the day before she signed a very restrictive abortion bill that pretty much made it illegal in the state and at the signing she said Alabama is a pro-life state – the next day she signed death warrants." The governor's office did not reply to a request for comment.

Numerous studies show the death penalty does not act as a deterrent, and is not a cost effective punishment in the US. The case of Nathaniel Woods may be "accelerating" America's rejection of capital punishment, Stubbs says. "It's time for this country to reject the discriminatory, inhumane, and error-prone punishment all together." Prosecutors have said Woods set up the ambush which caused the death of three officers. His supporters claim he received poor legal advice resulting in an inadequate investigation. Writing in an open letter, Spencer said: "Nathaniel Woods is 100 per cent innocent. I know that to be a fact because I'm the person that shot and killed all three of the officers that Nathaniel was subsequently charged and convicted of murdering." Kerry Spencer remains on death row to this day.

Lawful Use of Explosive Substances

Supreme Court: *R v Copeland* (Appellant) – UKSC 2019/0089 On appeal from the Court of Appeal Criminal Division (England and Wales). Mr Copeland was charged with two counts of having in his possession an explosive substance in circumstances giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that he had not made it for a lawful purpose, contrary to s.4(1) of the Explosive Substances Act 1883.

The issue was: For the purposes of section 4(1) of the Explosive Substances Act 1883, can personal experimentation or own private education, absent some ulterior lawful purpose, be regarded as a "lawful object"? By a majority, the Supreme Court allows the appeal.

Background to the Appeal: The appellant is 22 years old and, prior to these proceedings, had no convictions. He was diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder as a child and, in 2018, he was living with his mother. He began purchasing quantities of chemicals online. According to his account, this was because he had an obsessive interest in military matters, including bomb disposal. He claimed that he had acquired the chemicals because he wished to understand how explosives worked and to experiment with them. A search warrant was executed at the appellant's home on 24 April 2018, where it was found that he had managed to make a small quantity (about 10 grams or less) of a

sensitive primary explosive, Hexamethylene Triperoxide Diamine (“HMTD”). He also possessed manuals for making explosives, notes on making HMTD and a video on his mobile phone demonstrating the making of HMTD. When interviewed by the police, the appellant admitted his actions in acquiring chemicals and making explosives, and gave the explanation above. He was subsequently charged with certain offences, including two counts under section 4(1) of the Explosive Substances Act 1883 (“1883 Act”). As clarified in the course of the appeal, these counts are that the appellant knowingly had HMTD in his possession or under his control, in such circumstances as to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that he did not possess or control it for a lawful object. There is a defence if the accused can show that in fact he had the explosive substance in his possession or control for a lawful object which he identifies.

In his defence statement, the appellant maintained that he had made the HMTD for a lawful object, namely “interest, education and experimentation”. The appellant said that he had made other explosives and used them to create small explosions in the garden of his house without causing harm, and he intended to do the same with the HMTD. At a preparatory hearing in the Crown Court at Birmingham, HH Judge Wall QC held that he was bound by Court of Appeal authority, *R v Riding* [2009] EWCA Crim 892, to find that experimentation and self-education did not amount to a lawful object for the purpose of section 4(1). Accordingly, the judge ruled in advance of trial that the appellant’s proposed defence was bad in law. The appellant appealed unsuccessfully to the Court of Appeal, who considered themselves similarly bound. The court certified the following point of law of general public importance: for the purposes of section 4(1) of the 1883 Act, can personal experimentation or own private education, absent some ulterior unlawful purpose, be regarded as a lawful object?

The Supreme Court allows the appeal. Lord Sales gives the majority judgment, with which Lords Reed and Carnwath agree. Lords Lloyd-Jones and Hamblen deliver a joint dissenting judgment.

Reasons for the Judgment: The majority examines the 1883 Act in light of other amendments to the criminal law around the same time, namely the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (“1861 Act”) and the regulatory Explosive Substances Act 1875 (“the 1875 Act”) [14-15]. The 1883 Act was passed by Parliament with great speed due to fears around Irish nationalism and a perception that the 1861 Act, in particular, did not provide sufficiently for protection of the public [16]. The current regulatory regime is now primarily contained in the Explosives Regulations 2014, which like the 1875 Act before them, make clear that it is expected that private individuals, including “hobbyists”, may manufacture and keep explosives for their own private use [18].

In *R v Fegan* (1984) 78 Cr App R 189, the Court of Criminal Appeal in Northern Ireland explained that section 4(1) had been passed to address perceived deficiencies in other offences. These required proof of a specific mental element, and so were inadequate to guard against the risk of making or possessing explosives. The appellant, Fegan, acquired a firearm and ammunition (which qualified as explosive substances for the purpose of the 1883 Act) to protect himself and his family from threats against their safety and was convicted of an offence under section 4(1) of the 1883 Act. His appeal was successful, on the basis that although he had no licence for the possession of the firearm and ammunition, nonetheless he possessed them for a lawful purpose, i.e. to defend himself and his family [19-22]. Fegan was followed on similar facts in *Attorney-General’s Reference (No 2 of 1983)* [1984] QB 456 [24-25]. Finally, in *Riding*, the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales held that in the particular circumstances of that case, curiosity did not qualify as a lawful object for the possession of a home-made pipe bomb [26].

Under section 4(1), it is for a defendant to prove on the balance of probabilities that he had possession or control of an explosive substance for a lawful object. In English law, a purpose is lawful unless it is made unlawful by statute or the common law. A lawful object may, however, be tainted by an ulterior, unlawful purpose, including by knowledge or recklessness of a risk of injury or damage; but these would be matters to be explored on the evidence at trial [27-29].

The decision in *Riding* was correct on its facts, because the defence of the accused in that case was that he acted out of curiosity to see if he could construct a pipe-bomb but he did not need to use real explosives for that; and it was no part of his defence that he had wanted to experiment by making it explode. The decision does not provide an answer in the different circumstances of the present case and was misinterpreted in the courts below. Experimentation and self-education are “objects” within the ordinary meaning of that term and are capable of being lawful objects for the purposes of section 4(1). This view is reinforced by the background against which section 4(1) was enacted, including the 1875 Act, under which possession of explosive substances for private experimentation and use was regarded as lawful and legitimate [30-33], [35]. The Court of Appeal was wrong to conclude that the appellant was obliged to specify more precisely than he had done how the explosives would be used and that this would be lawful. The Court of Appeal’s reasoning was inconsistent with the *Fegan* and *Attorney-General’s Reference* cases, in which it had been held that an assertion of a general object of self-defence was lawful [34]. As there is nothing unlawful about experimentation and self-education as objects in themselves, they are capable of being lawful objects [37]. There is no requirement in law that a defence statement in relation to a charge under section 4(1) has to give a more detailed account of the proposed use of the explosive substance than that provided by the appellant [39]. The appellant ought to have been permitted to present his defence at trial [41], [43].

Lord Lloyd-Jones and Lord Hamblen dissent from the majority’s reasoning and would dismiss the appeal. They take the view, in common with the courts below, that personal experimentation and private education cannot in law amount to lawful objects within the meaning of section 4(1) [51]. The word “object” refers to the reason for doing something, or the result you wish to achieve by doing it. As such, the Court of Appeal was correct to hold that, to make out the defence, a defendant is required to show the use to which the explosive substance is to be put, and to do so with sufficient particularity to demonstrate that that use is lawful [52]. Reference to private education and personal experimentation is not enough, as the Court of Appeal previously held in *Riding* [54].

The defence is only made out if it is shown that the way in which the explosives were intended to be used is lawful. It is not enough to show that it may be lawful. A defence statement in response to a charge under section 4(1) should elaborate upon this and provide some details of the intended use. In the present case the appellant envisaged that experimentation would take the form of detonations of the explosives in his back garden, carrying an obvious risk of causing injury, damage to property, and a public nuisance. It was necessary to particularise how this would be carried out so as to avoid any such risk or would otherwise be lawful. Vague and general statements referring to personal experimentation or private education were insufficient and did not show how that was to be carried out lawfully [55]. Finally, *Fegan* and *Attorney-General’s Reference* are distinguishable, insofar as the object of use in lawful self-defence was plausibly raised in each. In contrast, in the present case no lawful use is identified, and the claimed objects neither give sufficient indication of the use to which the explosives are to be put, nor do they permit assessment of the lawfulness of any such use [56].

References in square brackets are to paragraphs in the judgment.

MOJ/FCO Ordered to Disclose Marerial's to Unus Rahmatullah - & - Amanatullah Ali

1. The claimants in this case are Pakistani nationals both of whom allege that they were captured by British forces in Iraq in February 2004. They contend that they were subsequently handed over to United States' control and, thereafter, taken to Afghanistan where they were subjected to prolonged detention, torture and mistreatment. 2. The case against the defendants is based upon three broad categories of allegation: i. mistreatment by UK personnel upon arrest and before the claimants were transferred to United States' control; ii. transfer to United States' control; and iii. failures thereafter to intervene to bring the claimants' detention to an end and/or stop the United States' authorities from further mistreating them ("the return claim")

3. The claims are strenuously denied.

4. As the claims proceed towards trial, two important issues have arisen between the parties relating to disclosure and applicable law respectively. For the sake of convenience and ease of reference, I have set about the task of giving separate written judgments on each issue. The applicable law issue is the subject of an open judgment. On the issue of disclosure, it has been necessary to provide an open and a closed judgment. This is the open version of the closed judgment.

5. The issue of disclosure has given rise to a good deal of mutual recrimination between the defendants and the Special Advocates (SAs) each accusing the other of taking bad points and causing unnecessary delay. I see no purpose in adjudicating on these matters and propose to concentrate on addressing the way forward. Furthermore, it is important that my decision should be promulgated as soon as practicable so as not to risk derailing the procedural timetable. As a result, it has been necessary for me to articulate my analysis in as succinct a way as remains consistent with my duty to provide proper reasons. One consequence of this approach is that I have not sought to resolve or comment on every argument raised either orally or in the voluminous written submissions presented to the court. However, the parties can rest assured that I have considered the full panoply of these arguments and, where I have not made express reference to them, it is because their resolution is not necessary for the purposes of reaching my conclusions.

6. Fortunately, the parties have made some progress in narrowing down the issues to be resolved. After the hearing of 15 October 2019, I invited the Defendants and the SAs to reformulate their submissions in writing to cover recent developments. So it is that the matters in issue have, at least for the time being, been attenuated. At this stage, the controversial areas cover three categories of documentation with which I propose to deal in turn. 7. The claimants allege that the defendants knew or ought to have known that detainees handed over to US authorities were liable to be rendered to third countries and there tortured or otherwise maltreated.

8. In response to concerns raised from other quarters, the Secret Intelligence Service ("SIS") and MI5 conducted a series of reviews into such complaints. These comprised: i. A review conducted by SIS and overseen by Sir Peter Gibson in 2009 [***] ii. A review conducted in 2009 by MI5 [***] iii. A further SIS review conducted between 2012 and 2014 [***] and iv. A further MI5 review conducted between 2012 and 2014 [***]

9. In addition, there is a residual category of cases which, for reasons of ongoing litigation or criminal investigation, did not form part of the earlier reviews.

10. SAs contend that all case summaries generated by the agency reviews be disclosed.

11. The defendants resist this approach and contend that some, but not all, of the case summaries are relevant on the application of the relevant and familiar test for standard disclosure.

12. The central issue is whether or not the defendants are applying too narrow a test for disclosure.

13. The defendants propose that the case summaries to be disclosed should be limited

to: i. Cases demonstrating US rendition practices before March 2004; ii. Cases describing the detention conditions in the Battlefield Interrogation Facility (BIF) at BIAP, where the claimants were held, before mid-2004; iii. Cases going to the issue of alleged US mistreatment of detainees prior to mid-2004; and iv. Detention conditions at the US-run facility at Bagram throughout the relevant time (i.e. prior to the claimants' capture/detention until their release).

14 The SAs point out that there is a dearth of information presently available to them relating to what the defendants knew of US practice on rendition and with respect to the alleged failure to take steps to secure the claimants' return from US control. In particular: i. [***] ii. [***] iii. [***]

15. Against this background the SAs argue that: i. The time periods to which the defendants seek to limit the scope of disclosure are unduly restrictive. For example, cases relating to rendition and mistreatment after 2004 continue to be relevant to the return claim; ii. Disclosure should extend beyond cases involving Bagram to the extent that such cases were capable of informing the defendants more generally as to the extent of any risks that the US might have been involved in or condoned the mistreatment or unnecessarily prolonged incarceration of detainees; iii. Even in cases in which the US was not involved, the cases will serve to illustrate the extent to which the decisions of the UK adequately protected the rights of detainees which were handed over.

16. I bear in mind that the overriding principle is that disclosure should be restricted to what is necessary in any given case but I am satisfied that the SAs' contentions are correct. In this regard, it must not be forgotten that the parameters of standard disclosure cover not only documents adversely affecting the disclosing party's case but also those which adversely affect the other party's case (see *Serious Organised Crime Agency v Namli* [2011] EWCA 1411). I have read and taken into account the terms of reference of each of the agency reviews and have concluded that all the case summaries are relevant. It is, of course, impossible to predict in advance which will adversely affect the claimants' case and which the defendants' case but, taken as a whole, they will flesh out the picture the entirety of which is relevant to the pleaded issues. I readily accept that some summaries are bound to be more salient than others but their cumulative impact has a relevance which cannot be preserved intact by the process of selection advocated by the defendants.

17. I note, in passing, that the point is not taken that the exercise of disclosing the case summaries would involve the expenditure of disproportionate time and costs. The documents are readily to hand.

18. In February 2004, Mr Belhaj and his wife were detained at Beijing Airport and flown to Kuala Lumpur whence they were rendered to Libya where both were imprisoned and maltreated. They alleged that the UK government had been complicit in these events and brought a civil claim for damages. On 10 May 2018, the Attorney-General read out in the House of Commons a letter of apology from the Prime Minister accepting that the "UK government's actions contributed to your detention rendition and suffering..."

19. Metropolitan Police had earlier conducted a criminal investigation into the circumstances leading to the rendition of Mr Belhaj [***]. This investigation was codenamed Operation Lydd.

20. The CPS decided not to prosecute on the grounds that it was not satisfied that the conflicting evidence they had accumulated was sufficient to secure a conviction of the offence of misfeasance in public office by the application of the criminal burden and standard of proof. In summary, the CPS was, however, satisfied that a British official had passed on relevant information to those involved in the rendition of Mr Belhaj with some degree of political authority so to do.

21 The SAs contend that the circumstances of the UK involvement in the rendition of Mr Belhaj, occurring as it did at about the same time as the detention and rendition of the claimants, are relevant to their claims.

22. The defendants' response, with respect to the Belhaj material generally, is that "its only potential relevance would be to the broader question of "knowledge" [***]. Of the Operation Lydd report, it contends it is simply not relevant to the claimants' cases.

23. I take the view that the Lydd report is bound to be relevant to the issue of the extent, if any, to which UK authorities may, in the light of their knowledge at the time, have struck the wrong balance between their legal responsibilities to those likely to become the subjects of rendition and broader political considerations. Although the Operation Lydd report was not directed specifically at the claimants' cases, the contents will have a generic significance falling within the scope of standard disclosure. In this regard, reference may be made to the case of *Nickeln v Symmons* [1996] P.N.L.R 245 which, although decided under the RSC, confirmed that documents relating to incidents other than the one directly the subject of the dispute may be relevant as supporting or adversely affecting another party's case. I see no reason why the same approach should not apply to the CPR. For the avoidance of doubt, if, which is not the case, the Operation Lydd report were only potentially relevant to credibility, then I would very probably have taken a different view.

24. During the course of oral submissions, the defendants suggested that a two page summary of the report could be produced but I am satisfied that, as with the case summaries, the context is an important factor governing relevance and the whole report should be disclosed.

25. The Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament ("ISC") produced a closed report of 2018 entitled "Detainee Mistreatment and Rendition: 2001-2010". The scope of the report is evidenced by the contents of the open version which is quoted from in detail in the SAs' closed submissions of 20 September 2019. There are earlier closed reports of 2005, 2007 and 2009.

26. I agree with the SAs' submissions that the closed reports are relevant and disclosable taking into account their subject matter. It may be that any opinions expressed therein will turn out to be of disputed admissibility but that is an issue for a later stage. Redactions to the reports serve to obscure a clear understanding of the material which they contain. The removal of references to individuals, countries, dates and the like is an impediment to a proper understanding of the documents as a whole. The procedural structure of the CMP is crafted to ring-fence material the open disclosure of which would be liable to harm the national interest. It is important that the balance which the procedure is intended to strike is not unnecessarily further tilted in favour of the party relying upon it by an unduly narrow interpretation of what is or is not relevant for the purposes of disclosure. My attention has been drawn to the case of *WH Holding Ltd v E20 Stadium LLP* [2018] 2578 (Ch) in which Snowden J cited with apparent approval the approach taken in *Hollander Documentary Evidence* 13th Ed at 10-16: "Where the material in the document is simply irrelevant, it is unlikely that there will be any point in blanking it out unless it is confidential."

27. I take the view that the approach of the defendants is antipathetic to the fulfilment of the overriding objective (as modified by CPR 82.2) in that it is liable to give rise to a disproportion between the time and money involved in piecemeal redaction compared with the dubious (if any) advantages to be gained from such an exercise. CPR 31.6 should not be so narrowly interpreted as to impair through redactions the intelligibility of the materials disclosed. Nor can it usually be appropriate for the resources of the court to be diverted into a prolonged and anxious scrutiny into the relevance of a catalogue of redacted material where there are no other grounds of exclusion than relevance relied upon.

28 It follows from the above that I accede to the SAs' applications for disclosure in the terms sought and will make an order to this effect the terms of which, I trust, can be agreed.

CCRC Slammed by Court of Appeal for Unreasonable Delay

Lord Justice Davis: 'Finally, we will direct that a transcript of this judgment is to be provided and considered by the Criminal Cases Review Commission. We do not wish unduly to belabour the point about delay; but, equally, this cannot and should not be glossed over or passed by. It remains of concern that the latest response of the Criminal Cases Review Commission would not seem to indicate much penitence at what has occurred. Delay may be unavoidable in some situations, and we repeat that we understand all the many pressures on the Criminal Cases Review Commission, which has but limited resources. Even so, a delay of 3 years and 9 months in a case of this particular kind is simply not good enough.

In August 2019 the Criminal Cases Review Commission referred the case of Tracey Newell to the Court of Appeal. On 29 November 2012, at Inner London Crown, Ms Newell pleaded guilty to seven counts of benefit fraud. The counts related to claims for Housing and Council Tax Benefit covering the period from 1 August 2005 to 5 December 2012. In January 2013, Ms Newell was sentenced to 18 weeks' imprisonment, suspended for 18 months, and 150 hours unpaid work. Confiscation proceedings were instigated. Later that year a Confiscation Order was made for £17,637.93, and Ms Newell was ordered to pay within 28 days or serve 12 months' imprisonment in default. Ms Newell appealed against the Confiscation Order, but in April 2014, the Full Court dismissed the appeal. However, when, at the request of Southwark Council, the enforcement of the Confiscation Order for £17,637.93 was considered at Inner London Crown Court in December 2014, the Judge concluded that, in spite of the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal, the original order remained valid and that he did not have jurisdiction to change it.

Ms Newell applied to the CCRC for a review of her case in January 2016. It took the CCRC 3 years and 9 months to make the referral. The decision in this case judgement was handed down on Thursday, 20 February 2020, in favour of Tracy Newell, confiscation quashed.

Below the relevant paragraphs condemning the CCRC

29. The first point to which we must allude is to the very great delay that has occurred here. As we have said, the substantive confiscation proceedings were to be regarded as at an end by, at the latest, December 2014. The application on behalf of the appellant to the Criminal Cases Review Commission was not made until January 2016. And the reference was not made to this court until August 2019.

30. This delay is not in any substantial way addressed by the reference itself. This court accordingly, in advance of the hearing today, sought an explanation for what had occurred. The explanation provided to this court yesterday (and we appreciate that the Criminal Cases Review Commission would have had relatively little time to put in a full response) with all respect, barely confronts the realities of the delay.

31. It is said that at the time of the initial application in 2016 there was a huge backlog within the Criminal Cases Review Commission and thus it was that the application was not considered until January 2017. As to the lapse of time thereafter, it then is sought to be said that the subsequent period was to a considerable extent taken up by correspondence between the Criminal Cases Review Commission and the London Borough of Southwark, as well as by internal consideration which was said to be needed in respect of the responses from the London Borough of Southwark.

32. We have noted all that has been thus far said. But the reality is that in this time from 2017 there were in effect two substantive letters from the Criminal Cases Review Commission to the London Borough of Southwark in that time and two substantive responses from the London Borough of Southwark. Periods of months elapsed before the letters were sent, responded

to, queried and responded to again. Moreover, it is not at all obvious to us that those responses, lengthy though they are, in truth add anything material to the sum of knowledge which was already known and addressed by the Tribunal judge in 2014. Ms Rose herself accepted as much.

33. The Criminal Cases Review Commission performs a valuable and important function. The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) has frequently been greatly assisted by it in achieving justice. We also entirely understand that the Criminal Cases Review Commission is under enormous pressure, with a huge case load and limited resources. We have regard to that of course, and we have sympathy for the Criminal Cases Review Commission in its position. But on any view, a delay of some 3 years and 9 months in dealing with a case of this kind is surely unacceptable. There are some cases before the Criminal Cases Review Commission which unquestionably need lengthy and meticulous and time-consuming investigation. But this was not of them. Here, the correspondence conducted was conducted in a desultory way and in effect seems to have achieved nothing of any material consequence different from what had been identified in 2014. No sense of any kind of urgency or indeed any kind of promptitude is revealed, notwithstanding that the case had not even first been addressed until January 2017 and so particular promptitude thereafter might have been expected.

34. Also, it is rather disconcerting, we have to say, that in its very recent written response, the Criminal Cases Review Commission seems to intimate no expression of contrition or apology or regret at all. Indeed, many of the points that need in this case to be addressed – for example, as to the proper application of s.23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 – are not fully addressed in that response, notwithstanding the court's query. Further, unfortunately it seems that no representative of the Criminal Cases Review Commission was available to appear before the court today, in spite of the court's request; and we had to raise our continuing concerns with Ms Rose, who, of course, had no instructions on the Criminal Cases Review Commission's behalf. We are grateful to her for her attempt to explain matters; but all we can say is that the position is still to be considered as thoroughly unsatisfactory.

47. Finally, we will direct that a transcript of this judgment is to be provided and considered by the Criminal Cases Review Commission. We do not wish unduly to belabour the point about delay; but, equally, this cannot and should not be glossed over or passed by. It remains of concern that the latest response of the Criminal Cases Review Commission would not seem to indicate much penitence at what has occurred. Delay may be unavoidable in some situations, and we repeat that we understand all the many pressures on the Criminal Cases Review Commission, which has but limited resources. Even so, a delay of 3 years and 9 months in a case of this particular kind is simply not good enough.

Victims of Police Domestic Abusers 'Are Powerless'

BBC News: Women domestically abused by police officers feel "doubly powerless" as their abusers are too often protected from facing justice, campaigners say. The Centre For Women's Justice (CWJ) has submitted a super-complaint claiming failures among police forces. They cite the cases of 19 women, including police officers, from 15 force areas who have been victims of abuse, violence, stalking and rape. It has been submitted to HM Chief Inspector of Constabularies.

The CWJ said that while "without doubt there are cases that are dealt with properly", a central concern was "police abusers are being protected and not brought to justice" because of their positions. The super-complaint, which is supported by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, said victims "feel doubly powerless". "They experienced the powerlessness

that most domestic abuse victims experience, but in addition their abuser is part of the system intended to protect them," the report said.

It calls for changes including: Victims being able to report their claims to the Independent Office of Police Conduct (IOPC) rather than a police force -Neighbouring police forces investigating such claims "should be the norm"- Officers guilty of abuse also being subject to misconduct procedures - Restrict officers facing allegations from working with victims of domestic or sexual abuse.

One of the women who gave her story to the CWJ told the BBC her ex-husband physically and sexually abused her as well using coercive and financial control. She said she reported him to his force, Northumbria Police, but no action was taken against him either criminally or by professional standards. "He used to say to me 'I'm a police officer no-one is going to believe you'," she said. The woman, who is from Tyneside, said police lost evidence she provided and her husband was given her witness statement, which later went missing from the system. She also said her husband accessed her medical records and "got access to a lot of things" civilians would not be able to get. "There's nowhere to go. When it's a police officer they can find you anywhere, they can trace your car," she said. If you try and prosecute someone who is a police officer, they know the court system and what questions they are going to be asked."

Northumbria Police said the BBC's refusal to share details of the case meant it was "unable to search our records to trace any report or potential subsequent investigation". But a spokesperson said all complaints of domestic abuse were "subject to a thorough and unbiased investigation" irrespective of who the suspect is. The BBC did not reveal the officer's name to the force out of a duty of care to the woman. The super-complaint cites a number of examples of no criminal charges being brought despite victims making reports and claiming to supply evidence. It also refers to cases where no misconduct proceedings took place, with one woman who claimed she was raped being told superiors would have a "quiet word" with the suspect.

What is a super-complaint? Since 2018, certain organisations approved by the Home Office have been able to make a super-complaint to address what they see as cultural or thematic failures in the country's police. "The super-complaints system is designed to identify systemic issues which are not otherwise dealt with by the existing complaints systems," the Home Office said. The complaint will be investigated by HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, the IOPC and College of Policing who will then decide what action, if any, needs to be taken. Previous super-complaints have covered the police response to victims of modern slavery and the use of protective measures in cases of violence against women and girls. Victims who are police officers said they faced "bullying and open hostility" from other officers. One said she had her application to join the firearms department "blocked" by her senior officer ex while another said colleagues accused her of being a liar.

The CWJ said there were difficulties for victims reporting the abuse amid fears they would not be believed. One claimed her partner said: "Who's going to believe you? There are lots of us." There were multiple cases featuring "failures in investigation", the CWJ said, with statements not being taken including from children who claimed they had been abused, investigators not listening to recorded evidence of the discussion of a rape, and one victim being told "you know how it works, it's your word against his". The CWJ cited "improper responses" to reports, including one woman being told she should "sit down together and sort it out" with the husband she claimed raped her. It also complained of accused officers knowing those investigating them, with "police culture" including a "sense of family" with "strong loyalty" within a force. "The criss-cross of personal connections undermines the trust of victims," the super complaint said.

One woman said she saw a photograph on social media of her partner and the officer investigating him for domestic abuse. The CWJ said police officers were less likely to be convicted of domestic abuse offences than non police workers. A Freedom of Information request showed there were 19 convictions for 493 reports against police officers, a rate of 3.9%, while the general population rate is 6.2%, the report said. The complaint will be investigated by HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, the IOPC and College of Policing who will then decide what action, if any, needs to be taken.

We Are Having No More. We Are Not Animals, We Are Human Beings.

Joe Sims: On the first day of the Strangeways protest, in April 1990, one prisoner declared that, 'We are having no more. We are not animals, we are human beings'. This painful and angry message reflected the motivation behind what became the longest demonstration in British prison history. The prisoners' direct experiences of the Strangeways regime convinced them to take the concerted action they did in spite of the retributive reckoning that would inevitably follow from the state. The prison's dehumanising and toxic regime meant that contempt, degradation, callous indifference, violence and the threat of violence, were institutionalised. If they had not taken to the roof, despite the formal and informal retribution they would suffer, would the world have known about their experiences, and the state's abject failure to fulfill its duty of care towards them? Given the pathological levels of secrecy suffocating British prisons, and the insidious relationship between the media and the state, the answer to that question is patently obvious.

Who's telling the truth about prisons? Prisoners have consistently been vilified and dismissed as incorrigible liars when they have described life inside. They, and us, inhabit a world where those at the top of the ladder of power - who are regarded, and who hypocritically regard themselves, as never lying, never committing crime and never doing harm - have easy access to the media which allows them to disseminate a particular 'truth' about prisons and those confined within them. Even the much-lauded, but narrowly focused, and ultimately futile, Woolf inquiry into the disturbance, qualified the prisoners' accounts of what happened by indicating that their evidence was not given on oath, a point that was not made about those state agents who also gave evidence. And yet, it was the prisoners at Strangeways, and not the state and its media acolytes, who were telling the truth about the prison's physically withering and psychologically lacerating regime.

The failures of imprisonment! Over the last three decades, in many ways, the crisis inside has gone from bad to worse as the recent, safety statistics released by the Ministry of Justice and a number of reports by the Chief Inspector of Prisons have documented: punitive, wounding conditions; corrosive pain and misery differentially experienced by black and minority ethnic and women prisoners; capricious discretion; and a demoralising lack of democratic accountability in regimes which traumatise and terrorise and which generate a sense of isolation and abandonment, despite the best efforts of some staff to be supportive and empathic. The scandalous failure to implement the Prison Inspectorate's recommendations across a range of areas has only reinforced the dominant culture of immunity and impunity that prevails. The devastating levels of self-harm and preventable deaths which have occurred in the last three decades provide a clear demonstration of this point. Other negative developments over this period have only added to the deep sense of crisis and foreboding gripping the prison system, and the criminal justice system more broadly.

A disinterested drift! Successive governments, over the past 30 years, should be utterly ashamed at their lamentable failure - political and moral - to learn lessons from three decades ago. Politicians have fallen back on simplistic, banal sound-bites or have offensively, and

wrongly, caricatured critics of their policies as being pro-crime and anti-victim. The continuous merry-go-round of justice and prison ministers has only added to a sense of disinterested drift. Unprincipled, puerile, political expediency has put prisons on the road to nowhere, except possibly to another Strangeways with potentially catastrophic consequences for prisoners and prison staff. What is needed are radically different criminal justice, penal and social policies built on social justice rather than criminal injustice, which, if implemented, would reduce crime and recidivism, protect victims and generate a collective sense of safety and protection for prisoners and for the wider society. Whether those in power have the vision, courage and good sense to think imaginatively and develop such radical alternatives is an entirely different matter.

Chernika v. Ukraine Violation of Article's 6 & 3

The applicant, Mykhaylo Chernika, is a Ukrainian national who was born in 1974 and lives in Lutsk (Ukraine). The case concerned his complaint about the absence of prosecution witnesses at his trial on drugs charges which had led to his conviction. In December 2009 the applicant was convicted after a retrial of selling drugs which he had obtained through his work as a police investigator, the drugs having earlier been seized in a case he had worked on. The court sentenced him to eight years' imprisonment. It relied in particular on pre-trial statements by three witnesses whom he had allegedly asked to sell the drugs for him and on the outcome of his formal pre-trial confrontations with them.

The witnesses were called to testify at the retrial but two of them were too ill, while the other - who had testified at his original trial - could not be located. The court also heard testimony from several other witnesses, including police officers, and examined documents which showed he had had possession of the drugs. His appeals against the verdict were rejected, with the Supreme Court making the final decision on his case in March 2011.

Relying on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) (right to a fair trial and right to obtain attendance and examination of witnesses), the applicant complained about the courts admitting the statements of the three witnesses in evidence against him, despite the fact that one of them had only been examined during the original trial and that two of them had not testified in court at all. Violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d). Just satisfaction: The court held that the finding of a violation constituted in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant; it further awarded the applicant EUR 1,500 for costs and expenses.

Six Police Officers to be Investigated Over Shooting of Anthony Grainger in 2012

Josh Halliday, Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2012/mar/12/six-police-officers-to-be-investigated-over-shooting-of-anthony-grainger>: Six officers including the former assistant chief constable of Greater Manchester police will be investigated for misconduct following an inquiry into the death of a man shot by armed police. Anthony Grainger, 36, was shot through the chest as he sat in a car in the village of Culcheth, Cheshire, in 2012 by an armed police officer known as "Q9". Detectives believed he and two others were planning to hold up a supermarket and had access to firearms on the evening of 3 March 2012. However, no weapons were found in the red Audi. Several senior Greater Manchester police (GMP) officers were heavily criticised in a report into the shooting by Judge Thomas Teague QC last year, which concluded after a two-year public inquiry that the force was entirely to blame for his death due to serious failings in its firearms unit.

On Thursday 12th March, the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) announced three new investigations into six GMP officers, including the former assistant chief constable Terry Sweeney. Sweeney, who was in effect third in command at the force, and two other senior offi-

cers – the former superintendent Mark Granby and an unnamed former chief inspector – were under investigation for gross misconduct in relation to their command and control of the operation, the IOPC said. All three officers are now retired. Another investigation is under way into a now-retired chief inspector and former inspector for gross misconduct over the use of a CS gas canister on the night Grainger died. The weapon, which incapacitates its targets, is not officially approved for use but had been used for at least five years by GMP at the time of the police shooting, the inquiry into Grainger's death heard. A third investigation was taking place into a serving GMP officer for misconduct in relation to their management of two firearms officers' training records, the IOPC said.

All but one of the officers under investigation have retired, meaning no action can be taken against them by GMP. An IOPC spokeswoman said it decided not to name four of the officers "on this occasion" after receiving representations from GMP and the Police Federation, but that it would keep the matter under review. Amanda Rowe, an IOPC regional director, said the public inquiry had raised further questions about the conduct of some GMP officers before, during, and after the death of Grainger. She said: "Having these serious matters brought to our attention meant we had to fully consider both Mr Justice Teague QC's report, and these referrals, before deciding what further actions we may need to take." Rowe said GMP had cooperated fully with the investigations. GMP declined to comment on why it had sought anonymity for four of the six officers under investigation. It said in a statement: "Following the publication of the Anthony Grainger Public Inquiry report in July 2019, Greater Manchester Police sent a further referral to the IOPC. The IOPC are to conduct independent investigations as a result of this referral which will be supported by GMP."

Mandatory Polygraph Tests - Counter Terrorism Bill

- We will introduce legislation via the Counter Terrorism Bill that will enable the Secretary of State for Justice to impose mandatory polygraph examinations on high risk offenders who have been convicted of terrorist offences or offences related to terrorism. The policy will require those who meet all the eligibility criteria to take a polygraph test three months post release and every 6 months thereafter, unless the test is failed. In such circumstances the offender will be required to take the test more frequently.

- We will appoint and train 4 qualified Probation Officers, experienced in managing high risk offenders to be qualified polygraph examiners.

- We will use a Polygraph Training School ('Behavioural Measures') that is already approved and commissioned by the Ministry of Justice and has trained the existing sexual offender and domestic abuse polygraph examiners in the National Probation Service. 'Behavioural Measures' is approved and licenced by the American Polygraph Association and operates to strict professional guidelines.

- We will review the value of testing terrorist offenders internally after 2 years.

Which offenders will be subject to testing? Testing will be imposed on those offenders who are • Aged 18 years and over • Male and Female • Assessed as Very High/High risk of serious harm using nationally accredited risk assessment tools. • Convicted of a specified terrorist offence or a specified offence with a terrorism connection. • The offender is sentenced to a term of custody of 12 months or more and released on licence • The legislation in relation to polygraph testing will apply retrospectively so will apply to those offenders who are already sentenced who meet the criteria.

Can offenders be recalled to custody for failing a polygraph examination?

- Offenders subject to testing cannot be recalled to custody for failing a polygraph test, however they can be recalled for making disclosures during the test that reveal they have breached other licence conditions or that their risk has escalated to level whereby they can no longer

be safely managed in the community. Those failing the test will be tested more frequently and in additional, stringent measures can be imposed such as additional licence conditions or formal warnings. Information gathered from a failed examination will be routinely shared with the police who are able to conduct further investigations that may or may not result in charges being made. Where charges are made the offender will be recalled to custody.

- Offenders who attempt to 'trick' the polygraph test, or refuse to take it can be recalled to custody.

In addition, and in line with the current testing of sexual offenders and those subject to measures to be introduced in the Domestic Abuse Bill, there will be a discretionary group who can also be made subject to mandatory testing. These would include those who meet the legal criteria but do not necessarily meet the policy position of High Risk of Serious Harm. This cohort will include those where there are sufficient concerns about the offender's risk of re-offending, so as to justify mandatory testing and ensuring it is 'necessary and proportionate' to manage the risk that the offender poses in the community. We will test all types of

- Polygraph examinations have been successfully used in the management of sexual offenders since January 2013 in the National Probation Service (NPS). Initially, this was as a successful pilot and later a national programme. The Polygraph is used with sexual offenders released on licence and its work by measuring the physiological changes in the body when the individual being tested is asked certain questions. The polygraph instrument measures changes in heart rate, blood pressure, respiratory rate and sweat and the changes to the individual's normal rates can indicate the subject is attempting to be deceptive. They are used to monitor compliance with licence conditions and the information obtained during testing is used by offender managers to refine and improve risk management plans. Examinations are carried out by experienced qualified Probation Officers who have been trained as accredited examiners to the standards set by the American Polygraph Association (APA) and who are also experienced in managing high risk offenders.

HMP Pentonville – Poor Progress Since Troubling Inspection In 2019

Inspectors from HM Inspectorate of Prisons (HMIP), revisiting HMP Pentonville to assess progress after a troubling inspection in 2019, found little evidence of positive improvement in a prison where violence had once again risen. In 2019, inspectors reported poor outcomes in the healthy prison test of safety, and not sufficiently good outcomes in respect, purposeful activity and rehabilitation and release planning. Violence had increased significantly since an inspection in 2017. The response to investigations into self-inflicted deaths was inadequate and support for prisoners in crisis was poor. In 2019, nearly one third of prisoners were locked up during the working day.

At the time of the 2019 inspection HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, Peter Clarke, seriously considered invoking the rarely-used Urgent Notification (UN) procedure, under which the Secretary of State for Justice must respond publicly to HMIP's findings within 28 days with plans for improvement. Mr Clarke decided not to follow this path "based on us having some confidence in the plans proposed by an enthusiastic new senior management team."

A follow-up independent review of progress (IRP) to assess key concerns and recommendations from the 2019 inspection took place in February 2020. Unfortunately, Mr Clarke said, the IRP findings "were a cause for continued concern." Prison inspectors found the poorest progress in any IRP since the new type of follow-up visit was introduced in April 2019. Ofsted inspectors who accompanied prison inspectors to follow up progress on their concerns relating to education, skills and work findings in 2019 found Pentonville managers had made reasonable progress against one of the themes but insufficient progress against the other two.

Mr Clarke added: “In terms of safety, until very recently there had been a lack of clear accountability at every level. Action planning to deliver the safety strategies that were now in place had been neither swift nor effective. Indeed, overall levels of violence had once again increased.” The report noted an overall increase in violence of 10%, with a 30% rise in assaults on staff. There were few incentives to motivate good behaviour, and too many adjudications – internal discipline procedures – for serious breaches of the rules were written off. “This failure to grip and manage key processes created a culture where violence and poor behaviour could all too easily go unpunished,” Mr Clarke said. Scrutiny of the increasing use of force had only begun in earnest a few weeks before the IRP, and managers could assure neither themselves nor inspectors that all uses of force were justified. Care processes for those in crisis were found, again, not to be managed effectively and, Mr Clarke commented, “the implementation of recommendations from previous self-inflicted deaths could only be described as lacklustre.”

Ofsted inspectors found that a high number of prisoners allocated to education never started their courses, and a third of prisoners who did start their course did not complete it. Work to reduce reoffending and prepare prisoners for release was slow to progress and had not been prioritised.

Overall, Mr Clarke said: “I was so concerned by the findings of this IRP that I wrote to the Secretary of State expressing my serious concern at the lack of progress. I was particularly disappointed to see that in many areas little or nothing had been done until very shortly before the IRP took place. I acknowledged that a change of leadership at the prison since the inspection had been problematic. I also made the point that lasting improvement would not be achieved through the simple expedient of reducing the prisoner population and giving more resources to the prison. The solution to most issues was in the gift of the prison, but would need a truly collaborative effort from all staff, clear leadership and support from HM Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS). Inspectors will return to Pentonville for a full, announced inspection in November 2020.”

Multiple Failures Contributed to Death of Dean George at HMP Swansea

INQUEST: The inquest into the self-inflicted death of Dean George in HMP Swansea has concluded, with the jury identifying multiple critical failures that contributed to his death on 10 April 2016. Dean was 40 years old. His family describe him as a fabulous child with a mischievous sense of humour. He was kind and helpful, and loved by the whole neighbourhood. Unfortunately, Dean was bullied in secondary school and after this he started getting into trouble. He started to misuse drugs and over the years he became dependent on heroin and alcohol. He ended up in the prison system as an extremely vulnerable person with complex mental health needs.

On 8 April 2016, Dean was imprisoned at HMP Swansea for eight weeks for failing to comply with probationary licence conditions which had originally been imposed for theft of two packets of razors. As he was not prescribed methadone in the community, Dean was denied opiate substitution treatment to manage his detoxification from heroin, and instead was forced to withdraw in a manner that healthcare witnesses agreed was “brutal” and “inhuman”.

The head of prison healthcare, an experienced nurse, assessed Dean’s physical and mental health the morning after his arrival in prison. She accepted in her evidence to the jury that the medical care of Dean had been “inadequate” and that numerous risk factors were overlooked. Immediately after this medical assessment, Dean was assaulted by two other prisoners and sustained a black eye and suspected fracture to his cheek bone. A short while later, he disclosed to a prison officer that he had tried to kill himself by hanging a few weeks earlier, and that he still wanted to die as he believed he had nothing to live for.

The officer started the prison suicide and self-harm (ACCT) procedures, but – contrary to mandatory national guidance – Dean’s risk was not assessed within 24 hours, or at any point prior to his death at around 4.30 pm the following day. Numerous witnesses accepted that – in addition to the suffering he would have experienced whilst detoxing – Dean’s history of mental ill health, drug and alcohol dependency, and the fact that he had previously tried to hang himself, put him at increased risk.

For reasons that remain unclear, officers’ evidence about the two hours before Dean’s death – given in statements to the police, Prison and Probation Ombudsman and under oath to the inquest jury – directly conflicted with the CCTV and cell bell records. What is clear, is that Dean was left alone in his cell in this period to undergo the brutal detoxification process on his own. Sophie Lazano, the Ministry of Justice’s prison group safety lead for Wales, accepted in her evidence to the jury that mistakes had been made in Dean’s care.

The inquest jury concluded that Dean died by hanging, and found that the following issues contributed to his death:

“Withdrawing for opiates against his will”;

“Inadequate risk assessment”;

“Lack of communication between medical and prison staff”;

“ACCT training that was “inadequate with some officers being untrained”;

“The system in place for managing opiate withdrawal which “was not equitable to what Dean would have access to in the community”.

The coroner indicated that he intended to write a Report to Prevent Future Deaths arising from the lack of a permanent system for opiate substitution therapy in HMP Swansea equivalent to that which is available in the community.

Dean always remained a ‘cheeky chappy’ and was a much loved and loving son and uncle. He is missed by many. Over 500 people attended his funeral. Lynette and Gary George, Dean’s parents, said: “After 4 years of waiting for this inquest, we now feel that justice has been done for Dean. The jury have confirmed what we knew all along, that Dean was failed when he needed help. We hope that other families don’t have to go through what we have.”

Deborah Coles, Director of INQUEST said: “It is clear that Dean was failed by society long before his death, by struggling health, welfare and social services. The inquest has revealed harrowing details of Dean’s withdrawal from addictions, and the inadequate response of the prison to his subsequent distress. In the short term, HMP Swansea must act on failings highlighted following numerous self-inflicted deaths and critical inquests, and ensure the health and safety of prisoners is their first priority. In the long term, protecting both prisoners and the public from more harm will require investment in our communities, not ineffective punitive policies.”

Serving Prisoners Supported by MOJUK: Walid Habib, Giovanni Di Stefano, Naweed Ali, Khobaib Hussain, Mohibur Rahman, Tahir Aziz, Roger Khan, Wang Yam, Andrew Malkinson, Michael Ross, Mark Alexander, Anis Sardar, Jamie Green, Dan Payne, Zoran Dresic, Scott Birtwistle, Jon Beere, Chedwyn Evans, Darren Waterhouse, David Norris, Brendan McConville, John Paul Wooton, John Keelan, Mohammed Niaz Khan, Abid Ashiq Hussain, Sharaz Yaqub, David Ferguson, Anthony Parsons, James Cullinane, Stephen Marsh, Graham Coutts, Royston Moore, Duane King, Leon Chapman, Tony Marshall, Anthony Jackson, David Kent, Norman Grant, Ricardo Morrison, Alex Silva, Terry Smith, Hyrone Hart, Warren Slaney, Melvyn ‘Adie’ McLellan, Lyndon Coles, Robert Bradley, Thomas G. Bourke, David E. Ferguson, Lee Mockble, George Coleman, Neil Hurley, Jaslyn Ricardo Smith, James Dowsett, Kevan & Miran Thakrar, Jordan Towers, Patrick Docherty, Brendan Dixon, Paul Bush, Alex Black, Nicholas Rose, Kevin Nunn, Peter Carine, Paul Higginson, Robert Knapp, Thomas Petch, Vincent and Sean Bradish, John Allen, Jeremy Bamber, Kevin Lane, Michael Brown, Robert William Kenealy, Glyn Razzell, Willie Gage, Kate Keaveney, Michael Stone, Michael Attwooll, John Roden, Nick Tucker, Karl Watson, Terry Allen, Richard Southern, Peter Hannigan.