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MOJUK: Newsletter 'Inside Out' No 769 (27/11/2019) - Cost £1

Former Mountjoy Prisoner Awarded €7,500 for Breach of Personal Rights

Róise Connolly, Irish Legal News: A former "protection prisoner" who was held in a cell with other prisoners without sanitation or running water for up to 23 hours a day has been awarded €7,500 in the Supreme Court. Emphasising that the case was fact-specific and that the award should not be seen as establishing a "benchmark", Mr Justice John MacMenamin held that the man was entitled to a declaration that the conditions of his detention infringed his constitutional rights under Article 40.3 of the Constitution.

The plaintiff, Gary Simpson, was a prisoner in Mountjoy between February and September 2013. As a "protection prisoner", Mr Simpson had to be kept in isolation from other prisoners – and was therefore detained in cells on the D1 wing in Mountjoy prior to the refurbishment of that part of the prison. At the time, there was no in-cell sanitation provided in the cells of D1 landing nor was there a sink or running water. Prisoners were normally provided with a slopping out chamber pot and a plastic bucket for water for washing their hands. Mr Simpson should have been entitled to detention in a cell by himself due to the fact that he was kept in his cell for up to 23 hours per day – however, due to overcrowding, Mr Simpson shared his cell with other prisoners.

In July 2014, Mr Simpson issued a plenary summons seeking various declarations and claiming damages including exemplary and punitive damages or, in the alternative, damages pursuant to s. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003. In his statement of claim, Mr Simpson alleged that he regularly had to urinate into empty milk cartons because the chamber pot he was given was too small to be used more than twice without being emptied. He also alleged that he had to defecate into a refuse bag for the same reason.

The declarations sought included: That the conditions and circumstances of his detention amounted to a breach of his right to dignity and his right not to be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment – in breach of Articles 40.3.1 and 40.3.2 of the Irish Constitution and Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). That the practice of slopping out and using a chamber pot in the context of shared cell occupancy amounted to a breach of his right to dignity and to respect for his private life as guaranteed by Article 40.3.1 and 40.3.2 of the Constitution and Article 8 of the ECHR. In September 2017, Mr Justice Michael White found that there had been a breach to Mr Simpson's constitutional right to privacy. However, while sympathising with Mr Simpson "in his distress about the conditions of his imprisonment which were unacceptable in many respects", Mr Justice White declined to make an award of damages citing Mr Simpson's "untruthful and exaggerated evidence".

Supreme Court: Stating that Mr Simpson had been exposed to distressing and humiliating conditions which "fell far below acceptable standards in an Irish prison in the year 2013", Mr Justice John MacMenamin said the conditions infringed Mr Simpson's "personal rights under Article 40.3 of the Constitution, including those of privacy, and the values of dignity and autonomy". Indeed, Mr Justice MacMenamin commented that Mr Simpson "was exposed to conditions that would have fallen below acceptable standards, even if this case had been taken a decade or more earlier". Emphasising that the numerous pending cases would "stand or fall on their own facts", Mr Justice MacMenamin said the outcome of Mr Simpson's case should only be seen "within the context of its particular timeframe and circumstances" and that the award should not be "seen as establishing a "benchmark" when other cases may differ on their facts". Mr Justice MacMenamin concluded that Mr Justice White had adopted the correct approach in his application of the law, but disagreed as to the form of the declaration and the extent of the remedy. Varying the order of the High Court, Mr Justice MacMenamin held that Mr Simpson's case was an appropriate case for moderate compensatory damages of €7,500. Mr Justice MacMenamin also granted a declaration that the conditions of Mr Simpson's detention between the 13th February and the 30th September, 2013, infringed his constitutional rights under Article 40.3 of the Constitution. In a concurring judgment, Mr Justice Donal O'Donnell said he had no doubt that the treatment was prohibited by Article 40.3.2 of the Constitution, and that the treatment, "at least in general terms, would fall foul of Article 3" of the ECHR. Agreeing that the right of the person protected by Article 40.3.2 were breached in this case, Mr Justice O'Donnell said that when the Constitution is viewed as a whole "it seems clear that the guarantee of protection of the person in Article 40.3.2 must mean that, while the State may lawfully deprive a citizen of liberty in accordance with law, it may not do so by a means which, far from assuring the dignity of the individual, falls below a standard that could be considered minimally acceptable".

Concerns After Number of People Punished for Offences Hits 50-Year Low

Jamie Grierson, Guardian: The number of offenders passing through the criminal justice system in England and Wales has hit its lowest level in nearly 50 years, official figures have shown. There were 1.58 million people formally dealt with by the criminal justice system between July 2018 and June 2019 compared with 1.86 million in 1970, according to Ministry of Justice data. The number of those convicted of criminal offences who were sent straight to jail – 75,800 – was also at its lowest level for a decade, falling to 6.5%. Prosecutions and out-of-court disposals such as community resolutions, cautions or penalty notices in England and Wales fell 2% in the past year to their lowest level since records began in 1970.

Boris Johnson's government is proposing a hard-line approach to crime with plans to build more prison cells and increase sentences for some offenders. Critics have argued that the proposals go against a wealth of evidence that supports a more rehabilitative-focused approach. About 1.37 million defendants were prosecuted in the past year, with the number facing magistrates court down 2%, continuing a downward trend since 2016. The average length of a prison sentence rose to 17.4 months, the highest in the past 10 years, having steadily climbed since June 2009 when it was 13.5 months, the MoJ figures show.

The number of suspects on bail after being questioned by police also fell by 10% since June last year. Police recorded crime rose overall by 6% to 5.3m offences excluding some fraud crimes. Researchers believe this rise is linked to better recording of crimes among police forces and victims being more willing to come forward. There was a 10% drop in the number of penalty notices handed out for disorder, falling to 20,500. Being drunk and disorderly, harassment and causing alarm or distress, theft of items costing under £100 and possession of cannabis were the offences accounting for 91% of all the notices issued. There was a 14% decrease in the number of cautions handed out, down to 64,900. About 78% of the cautions issued for serious offences were for drugs, theft and violence.

Lawyers said the figures showed the extent to which the public were being let down by the justice system and called on the next government to commit to investment. Richard Atkins QC, the chair of the Bar Council, described the figures as a "major concern", adding: "The inescapable fact is that the disproportionate cuts to the criminal justice budget over many

years has broken the system. Only a considerable investment in the criminal justice system by the next government will reverse the damage and restore public confidence."

Caroline Goodwin QC, the chair of the Criminal Bar Association, said: "Protecting the public from harm is a basic, core duty any government has to the public and, quite rightly, the public expect that duty to be fulfilled. "Talk by politicians about being 'tough on law and order' remains just that until substantial investment is made all the way through the system – not just in the police, but the CPS [Crown Prosecution Service], criminal legal aid defence, courts and parole service so reported offences are properly investigated, then charged, prosecuted and brought to trial in a timely manner. "Anything less won't do. The public cannot be short-changed."

Priti Patel's Demonisation of Gypsies An Attack For Political Gain

[The home secretary,Priti Patel, this month announced plans to crack down on unauthorised Traveller camps, including by making trespass a criminal offence. But police responses to a consultation launched last year about dealing with such encampments show forces are opposed to such a move.]

George Monbiot: Guardian: This is how it begins: with a theatrical attack on a vulnerable minority. It's a Conservative tradition, during election campaigns, to vilify Romany Gypsies and Travellers: it tends to play well on the doorsteps of middle England. But what the home secretary, Priti Patel, proposed last week is something else. It amounts to legislative cleansing. The consultation document she released on the last day of parliament aims to "test the appetite to go further" than any previous laws. It suggests that the police should be able immediately to confiscate the vehicles of "anyone whom they suspect to be trespassing on land with the purpose of residing on it". Until successive Conservative governments began working on it, trespass was a civil and trivial matter. Now it is treated as a crime so serious that on mere suspicion you can lose your home.

When I say "you", obviously I don't mean you, unless you are a Romany Gypsy, a traditional Traveller or a New Traveller. If you're on holiday in your caravan, it does not affect you. It applies only if you have "intent to reside" in your vehicle "for any period". In other words, it is specifically aimed at travelling peoples. It is clearly and deliberately discriminatory.

It's true that some people have sometimes behaved appallingly, damaging places, leaving litter and abusing residents. But there are already plenty of laws to prosecute these crimes. The government's proposal, criminalising the use of any place without planning permission for Roma and Travellers to stop, would extinguish the travelling life.

The consultation acknowledges that there is nowhere else for these communities to go, other than the council house waiting list, which means abandoning the key elements of their culture. During the Conservative purge in the late 1980s and early 1990s, two thirds of traditional, informal stopping sites for travellers, some of which had been in use for thousands of years, were sealed off. Then, in 1994, the Criminal Justice Act repealed the duty of local authorities to provide official sites for Roma and Travellers.

Over the past few weeks in Grimsby, Lincolnshire, local people have been debating the merits of the council's proposal for an official transit site for travelling people. According to one councillor, there have been threats to stone, bottle and petrol bomb anyone who uses it, if planning permission is granted. For centuries, Roma and Travellers have been hounded from parish to parish, suffering prejudice and bigotry as extreme as any group faces. Now the government is stoking it.

Patel's proposed laws belong to the most dangerous of all political categories: performative oppression. She is beating up a marginalised group in full public view, to show that she sides with the majority. I don't know whether she really intends to introduce these laws, or whether this is

empty electioneering. In either case, she is playing with fire. Already this month, three caravans in Somerset have allegedly been torched by suspected arsonists. Travelling peoples have been attacked like this for centuries, and sometimes murdered. In 2003, a 15-year-old Traveller child, Johnny Delaney, was kicked to death by a gang of teenagers in Ellesmere Port, Cheshire. One of them is reported to have explained to a passer-by, "He was only a fucking Gypsy."

I asked a traditional Traveller how Patel's legislation would affect her. Briony (not her real name) told me she had ploughed her life savings into her motorhome, which she parks out of people's way, beside roads within easy reach of her children's school. She has good relations with local people, many of whom know her and see her as part of the community. But none of this will help.If this proposal becomes law, "the police will have the power to kick my door in, take my home, arrest me and take the children into care. We won't get them back because we won't have a home. Because of my work, I can't afford a criminal record. When I walk out of the police station, I will have no home, no assets, no children and no career." It would also leave her without state protection. "Sometimes, we've had to call the police when we're on the receiving end of hate crimes. This legislation would mean we had to go under the radar." Understandably, she is terrified.

She has nowhere else to go. "There's one transit site half an hour away, but you can stay there only for 28 days a year. So my only option is roadside. Roadside is our cultural heritage." Stopping by the road has already been made extremely stressful and precarious by existing laws that allow the police to move people on. Patel's proposal, turning trespass into a crime, would stamp it out altogether. It would end a migratory tradition that's as old as humanity.

As Briony points out, this is collective punishment. "The majority of us are minding our own business. We're providing our own housing, not relying on the government. But everything I do that's positive is lost in people's minds. Most people I meet have no idea I'm a Traveller. We're invisible until we do something wrong. Then people notice we're Travellers."

A week before Patel launched her consultation, the Wiener Holocaust Library in London opened its exhibition on the Porajmos: the genocide of Roma and Sinti people carried out by the Nazis. It shows how ancient prejudices were mobilised to destroy entire peoples. I'm not saying that this is how the situation will unfold in this country, but the exhibition shows us the worst that can happen when the state sanctions the demonisation of an outgroup. First they came for the Travellers …

Secret CPS Targets May Have Led To Rape Cases Being Dropped

Caelainn Barr and Owen Bowcott, Guardain: Tens of thousands of rape cases may have been dropped because of secret targets implemented by the Crown Prosecution Service, it has emerged. The unofficial policy for prosecutors to have "levels of ambition" of achieving a 60% conviction rate in rape cases may have encouraged them to drop cases where there was not a high prospect of conviction. The hidden benchmark could go some way towards explaining why rape prosecutions and convictions are currently at their lowest levels in more than a decade. Last year the Guardian reported prosecutors were encouraged by the CPS to take a more risk-averse approach in rape cases by taking a proportion of "weak cases out of the system".

The CPS has repeatedly denied that it has changed its approach to rape cases. However, in a statement to the Law Society Gazette, which first uncovered the targets imposed on staff between 2016 and 2018, the CPS admitted they were "not appropriate" and may have acted as a "perverse incentive" deterring the prosecution of less straightforward cases. Under the public code of practice a case ought to be prosecuted if it is in the public interest and the likelihood of a conviction is "realistic", in other words greater than 50%.

However prosecutors were also asked to work to different "levels of ambition" targets. These performance measurements were introduced in 2008 for a range of crimes. The ambition levels were expressed as a percentage of the number of cases where charges were brought that resulted in conviction. Between 2008 and 2016 the target conviction rate was 76.5% for domestic violence and rape cases. In 2016 the target was disaggregated and the rape target was dropped to 60%.

Harriet Wistrich, the director of the Centre for Women's Justice, said: "If you have a target and you want to try and meet that target … you're essentially not applying the correct test. The test ought to be 'more likely than not' … They are in violation of their own code." The CPS denied the shift in "levels of ambition" for rape cases constituted a change in approach. It said the targets were referred to in its annual reports. However the Guardian could find no such reference.

The Law Society Gazette said they discovered the "levels of ambition" when they were referred to in HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate reports. The CPS is facing a judicial review challenge over other allegedly covert policy changes that are blamed for a dramatic collapse in the number of rape cases going to court. While the number of rapes reported to the police nearly tripled between 2014 and 2018, the End Violence Against Women coalition (EVAW) points out that the number of cases charged and sent to court fell by 44%. On Monday the Guardian reported on a leaked Cabinet Office report that said half of rape victims are dropping out of investigations, as a growing proportion do not want to pursue a prosecution even when a suspect has been identified. Rebecca Hitchen, for EVAW, said: "This is a shocking admission from the CPS, as it acknowledges what we have repeatedly claimed – that performance targets linked to conviction rates will result in CPS prosecutors charging 'stronger' cases and dropping 'weaker' ones in order to make itself look better. This is why the numbers of rape cases reaching trial has plummeted and why we are judicial reviewing the CPS."

A CPS spokesperson said: "Rape is a devastating crime, and CPS policy is clear: whenever the legal test is met, our dedicated prosecutors will bring charges, no matter how challenging the case. This policy has not changed. Every decision is, and always has been taken in the same way, following the Code for Crown Prosecutors. "While it is important that we track trends, and constantly strive to improve performance, no individual charging decision is influenced by any factor other than the merits of the case. The growing gap between the number of rapes recorded, and the number of cases going to court is a cause of concern for all of us. We will implement any improvements suggested as part of the ongoing, cross-justice system rape review."

Violation of Rights of Nine-Year-Old Who Witnessed Father's Violent Arrest

In Chamber judgment in the case of A v. Russia (application no. 37735/09) the European

Court of Human Rights held, unanimously, that there had been: two violations of Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment/investigation) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The case concerned the applicant's allegation that she had been traumatised by witnessing her father's violent arrest by the police when she was nine years old. The Court found that the applicant's allegations were credible, but that the authorities' only response had been to carry out a pre-investigation inquiry, which was superficial and ineffective. Moreover, the law-enforcement officers, who had to have been well aware that the applicant was or would be on the scene of the operation, had taken no account of her interests when planning and carrying out their operation against her father, thus exposing her to a scene of violence. That had very severely affected her, as she had suffered in particular from a neurological disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder for several years afterwards. In the Court's view, the applicant witnessing such a violent incident had amounted to ill-treatment which the authorities had failed to prevent, in breach of Article 3.

Michael Weir: Not Guilty in 1998 but Found Guilty in 2019!

A burglar who beat two elderly people to death in their homes to steal a watch and jewellery has been convicted of their murders two decades on. Michael Weir fatally attacked 78-year-old Leonard Harris and Rose Seferian, 83, in 1998, the Old Bailey was told. The original investigation missed clues to the killer but DNA testing linked Weir to the London attacks after 20 years, the court heard. Weir, 52, of Hackney, had denied two counts of murder. Prosecutor Tom Little QC told the jury the "defenceless pensioners" had been struck repeatedly and knocked to the ground then left for dead. Weir was previously acquitted of the murder of Mr Harris by the Court of Appeal, jurors were told. But he was retried under the so-called double jeopardy law which allows a defendant to be retried if new and compelling evidence is brought forward and it is in the interests of justice. Trial judge Mrs Justice McGowan told the jury they had made "legal history".Sentencing was adjourned until a date to be fixed.

Defendant Pays an Extra £65,000 After Fractional Part 36 Defeat

John Hyde, Law Gazette: Alosing party has been ordered to pay an extra £65,000 after declining to settle a case over a difference amounting to less than £5,000. The claimants in Hochtief (UK) Construction Ltd & Anor v Atkins Ltd had made a Part 36 offer to settle for £875,000, with the defendant having three weeks to respond. That offer was not accepted and the claimants obtained judgment more than two years later for £879,848. Mrs Justice O'Farrell made clear that Part 36 rules applied even when the difference between the rejected offer and the final award was relatively small. The ruling serves as a warning to all litigants that seemingly tough outcomes for failing to beat a Part 36 offer continue to be imposed by the courts. In giving her judgment, O'Farrell J stated the claimants had achieved a judgment sum at least as advantageous as the one they had offered. A further costs order, she noted, should only come based on the terms of the Part 36 offer, the stage in proceedings when it was made, the information available to the parties at the time, the conduct of the parties and whether the offer was a genuine attempt to settle proceedings. The judge said of Hochtief: 'The terms of the offer were clear. The Part 36 offer was made at a very early stage in the proceedings, after the letter of claim but before the issue of the formal claim. By that time, extensive investigations and remedial works had been concluded.' She ruled the claimants, who had been involved in a contract dispute, were entitled to an enhanced rate of interest on damages and costs from the date of expiry of the offer. She set interest on damages at 6% above base rate and ordered that costs be assessed on an indemnity basis. The claimants will receive an extra £65,123 as a result on top of their awarded damages.

CoA Orders "Unprecedented" Second Retrial Following Death Of 10-Year-Old Girl

Local Government Lawyer: The Court of Appeal has ordered a second retrial in care proceedings relating to five siblings following the death of a ten-year-old girl in 2016, describing the judgment from the first retrial as"wrong and procedurally unjust". Summarising the case of A (No. 2) (Children: Findings of Fact) [2019] EWCA Civ 1947, Lord Justice Peter Jackson said that in November 2016, the girl (S) was found dead in her bedroom. "Also in the home were her parents and her five siblings, including two older brothers." The Court of Appeal judge said that "S died of strangulation and had suffered recent injuries to her genital area. The police investigation was deficient. No criminal charges have been brought. An inquest was opened and adjourned." The local authority issued care proceedings to protect the siblings. It alleged that S had been sexually assaulted and killed but that it was not possible to say who among

the parents and older brothers might be responsible. “The family deny this. Its position has been that S's injuries and death must have been the result of an accident in which she fell from her bunk bed, entangled in some netting. It has also raised the possibility that S had been attacked by an intruder," the Court of Appeal judge said.

There have since been two trials. In December 2017, Mr Justice Francis found that the local authority had not proved its case and he dismissed the proceedings. The local authority appealed and the decision was overturned by the Court of Appeal in July 2018. The retrial came before Mr Justice Hayden in early 2019. In a judgment given in June 2019, he found that S's mother had caused the genital injuries in the course of an attempt at female genital mutilation (FGM) that took place outside the home and that she had then strangled S in her bedroom after their return. The father, but not the brothers, had colluded to hide what had happened. The parents, supported by the brothers, appealed.

Lord Justice Peter Jackson said: “Having heard the arguments, I am in no doubt that the appeal must succeed on the grounds that the decision was both wrong and procedurally unjust. The FGM finding was conjectural and unsupported by any real evidence. It had not been alleged, or even investigated, and therefore took the parties by surprise. It must be set aside, and as it is the foundation for the identification of the mother as having killed her daughter, that finding cannot stand either.” The local authority invited the Court of Appeal to substitute its own findings, but Lord Justice Peter Jackson said he would decline that invitation. “It would only be a proper course if there was just one realistic outcome and that is not the case here.”

As to whether a second retrial should be ordered, the family, supported by the Guardian, pleaded that it need not and that the proceedings should come to an end. “With a heavy heart, I cannot agree,” Lord Justice Peter Jackson said. “The circumstances are too serious, and a further hearing may yet provide an outcome that is of value one way or another to the surviving children.” He said that in deciding the issue as to whether there should be a rehearing, the Court of Appeal had a broad discretion, “and the discretion is particularly broad when we are considering whether to order what is probably an unprecedented second rehearing”.

Lord Justice Peter Jackson said at paragraph 127 that he took account of: “(1) The seriousness of the issues. In a case of this extreme gravity, a party, here the local authority, should in my view only be shut out from a determination of its case if there are strong countervailing reasons. (2) The interests of the children. If it is possible, it is in the interests of all the children, and the youngest three in particular, for there to be valid findings about their sister's death and for measures to be taken for their protection if that proves to be necessary. (3) The likely evidential result. Although it is profoundly unsatisfactory that there is still no clarity about how S came by her injuries and death, there is no reason to believe that a rehearing cannot provide a legally valid conclusion that would make the matter clear, or at least clearer. This case is different to Re J, where the evidence was incapable of supporting findings. Here, two appeals have succeeded because of errors of process and not because the evidence is incapable of justifying a s.31 finding. If the local authority was to succeed, the court might face a very difficult welfare decision, but that is not a good reason for abandoning the proceedings. (4) The fairness of a further trial. I am alive to the concerns expressed about litigation fatigue and its possible effect on the integrity of the trial and the assessment of witnesses. At the same time, it is at least possible that some of the professional evidence already heard can be carried forward so that it need not be given again. As to the lay evidence, the trial judge will no doubt be alert to the risks that have been pointed out to us. I would therefore not accept that there cannot be a fair trial. (5) The impact upon the family. This carries significant weight where proceedings have already lasted for three years and

where a further trial must considerably extend that period. The emotional cost to the family of the loss of S and of the continuous proceedings cannot be overstated. The Guardian has made the observation that they have not yet properly been able to mourn S's death. I am mindful of all this, and take it into account. In the end, however, it has not been shown that the burden of continued proceedings would be disproportionate to the seriousness of the matters in issue.”

Lord Justice Peter Jackson said that after full reflection, he would therefore hold that “in these most unusual circumstances a second retrial is unavoidable and that it would serve the interests of justice”. Agreeing, Lord Justice Underhill said: "I feel acutely the force of the argument that it would be wrong to put this family, and indeed the witnesses who would have to be called, through the ordeal of such a hearing, particularly when there can be no certainty – bearing in mind the evidential problems to which I have already referred – that it will result in a definitive finding or one which will lead to a straightforward welfare decision. "I have wrestled with this, but in the end I think the balance must come down in favour of a further hearing, for the reasons given at para. 127 of Peter Jackson's LJ judgment. His points (1) and (2) carry great weight. A child has died, and (then or shortly before) sustained significant genital injuries, in the middle of the night in a house occupied only by members of her own family. It is of the greatest importance, from the point of view of all the members of the family, that valid findings be made as to how that happened; and, like Peter Jackson LJ, I am not persuaded that findings may not still be made which will enable the local authority to reach a properly-informed decision about how to proceed." The local authority's application was therefore remitted to the family court for a retrial preceded by an early case management hearing in accordance with arrangements that had been made with the President of the Family Division.

New Legislation Needed to ‘End The Injustice’ of IPP Prisoners

Justice Gap: Calls have been made for new legislation to ‘end the injustice’ of prisoners being stranded in prison indefinitely on indeterminate sentences. A report from the Prison Reform Trust and the University of Southampton argues that ‘the pains and barriers’ faced by families of people serving IPP sentences have not sufficiently been addressed. Introduced by New Labour Hone Secretary David Blunkett under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, IPP sentences imposed a minimum tariff on prisoners after which they were imprisoned for an indeterminate period with their eligibility for release to be determined by the Parole Board. Those released were then subject to an indefinite period of supervision on licence, reviewable after 10 years. Such sentences were intended to protect the public from serious offenders whose crimes did not warrant a life sentence.

While the Home Office initially estimated that the introduction of IPP sentences would result in the imprisonment of some 900 people, more than 8,000 IPP sentences have been imposed. As justice secretary, Ken Clarke abolished IPP sentences in 2012 under the Legal Aid Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act (LASPO). At the time, he called indeterminate sentences a ‘stain’ on the justice system. You can read more about the history of IPPs (here). There remain 2,223 prisoners serving such sentences, and more than nine out of 10 have been imprisoned beyond their minimum tariff (93%) with 187 prisoners still detained over a decade after their minimum tariff expired.

According to the report, the lack of adequate support for the families of those serving IPP sentences detrimentally impacts not only the relatives of these prisoners but the prisoners themselves – a 2016 report from the Prison Reform Trust noted that IPP prisoners had one of the highest rates of self-harm in the prison population, and serious concerns were highlightedby former chair of the Parole Board Nick Hardwick in 2017. According to the latest figures from the Ministry of Justice,

more IPP prisoners were returned to custody after licence recall (636) than were released from custody (433) and that over the same period the recalled IPP population has grown by 25%.

'The suffering caused by this disastrous sentence goes on and on,' commented the PRT's director Peter Dawson. 'It extends far beyond the people still unjustly held in prison, affecting parents, partners and children, all totally innocent. Legislation is needed to finish the job of putting right the injustice done to so many by the IPP sentence. But in the meantime there is scope to do more to support families, reducing their pain and helping them to help their loved ones make a success of life after release.' Dr Harry Annison, one of the report's authors, said that IPP families carried 'considerable burdens in supporting their relative through their sentence'. 'All criminal justice organisations should avoid inadvertently placing further burdens on those who have often given years of devoted support to their relative,' he added.

Why I Am Boycotting Britain's Two-Tiered Justice System

Tauqir Sharif: Secret courts and draconian citizenship-stripping powers are an affront to the values of open justice and due process that I once assumed to be my birthright On 26 May 2017, my family in the UK received a letter informing them that my British citizenship had been revoked. This started what became a legal marathon spanning the last two years. Today, I have decided to bring it all to an end. Being British is part of who I am. I was born and raised in the UK. I attended schools and colleges there. Revoking my citizenship rights changes none of that. I have always believed that we had a robust legal system in the UK. I felt safe knowing that if I was ever to be falsely accused, I would have my day in court and be able to adequately defend myself. This is an assumption all British people should have. But this all changed when I began the process of defending myself against citizenship removal.

Firstly, my case was to be heard at a secret court known as the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC). This meant I had no access to the evidence against me, nor could I choose who I wanted to represent me. To engage with this process, my lawyers had to instruct a "special advocate" - a vetted barrister approved by the government - and tell him everything that needed to be known about me. This had to be done without me or my lawyers ever seeing the actual evidence being used against me.

Secondly, defending yourself against allegations where no evidence is presented to back them up is impossible. It became clear to me that the special advocates were merely there to keep up appearances; to give an image that justice is being served. The reality could not be more different. I no longer want to be party to a system that is rubber-stamping a kind of medieval exile process against its own people

Thirdly, in the course of the legal action, it dawned on me that the state's discretion is absolute in these cases. Those who have won their cases have only ever done so on technicalities with no bearing on the draconian nature of citizenship deprivation. Almost all citizenship deprivation cases are upheld by the SIAC courts. Based on these hard facts, I realised that I would not get the fair trial I once believed was my right as a British citizen - so I have decided to boycott the SIAC process. The whole process amounts to a two-tier justice system that has been used on an unprecedented and discriminatory scale against British Muslims. I no longer want to be party to a system that is rubber-stamping a kind of medieval exile process against its own people. I and my children will live with the uncertainty that we are forever stateless.

Affront to justice: Because I'm the child of immigrants, the UK government believes it can treat me as a second-class citizen. This is despite the fact that the work I do today, in saving lives, has been to a large extent inspired by what I believed were the British values of compassion and doing good for others. Today, we have 41 aid projects in Syria, employing more than 200 people. However, the British government has rendered me stateless, claiming I am "not conducive to the public good". The SIAC and special advocate system are an affront to justice. They cannot exist in a country that respects any semblance of due process. I hope my actions will inspire others facing a similar situation to also boycott the SIAC, as well as lawyers who believe in due process, so that we can bring this country back to its senses.

Roger Kearney V Chief Constable of Hampshire Police

1. The Appellant, Roger Kearney, has been seeking to challenge by judicial review, the failure or refusal by the Chief Constable of Hampshire Police, the Respondent, to disclose original CCTV footage said to be relevant to his appeal against his conviction for murder. Andrews J refused permission to apply for judicial review. She held the application was totally without merit ("TWM") so that the Appellant was not entitled to renew his application at an oral hearing.

2. This appeal is a challenge to those decisions (to use a neutral term for reasons that will appear below), but a preliminary jurisdictional question arises as to whether the proposed appeal is "from a judgment of the High Court in any criminal cause or matter" so that s.18(1)(a) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 applies to restrict the Court of Appeal's jurisdiction to consider it.

3. It is common ground that if the court has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal, then, subject to a point of law of general public importance first being certified, the only route of appeal from the Administrative Court is or would be to the Supreme Court with permission granted either by the Administrative Court or by the Supreme Court itself. On the other hand, if the court does have jurisdiction, the question whether permission to appeal should be given must then be determined.

4. The background against which the jurisdictional question arises can be summarised as follows. The Appellant was convicted of the murder of Paula Poolton who was killed in October 2008. There was no forensic evidence linking him (or any other individual) to this murder, as was made clear to the jury. His conviction was based on many strands of circumstantial evidence of varying degrees of strength and cogency. One of these strands was the prosecution and defence CCTV experts' interpretation of CCTV footage relied on by the prosecution to show the probability that the vehicle captured in various frames between 21.30 (when he left home and drove to meet the victim), 21.40 (when she was captured on CCTV at Tesco), and 22.26 (when her phone stopped responding to calls/texts) and he continued to his work, arriving late and completing his shift, was the motor car driven by the Appellant, albeit there was no positive evidence identifying that vehicle by its registration number since no registration plate was visible.

5. Following his unanimous conviction on 11 June 2010, the Appellant applied for permission to appeal but was refused permission by Evans J (on the papers) by a decision of 18 November 2010. An application to renew to an oral hearing was made but withdrawn by the Appellant before the hearing. That withdrawal brought the criminal appeal proceedings to an end.

6. Subsequently, in December 2012 the Appellant made an application to the Criminal Cases Review Commission ("the CCRC") to refer his conviction to the Court of Appeal Criminal Division. To support his application to the CCRC, the Appellant requested (for the first time) the original CCTV footage from which extracts were produced by the prosecution at his trial and assembled in a compilation disc played to the jury at trial. It is his case that the original footage is relevant to the question whether or not he left home in sufficient time to have committed the murder before he arrived at his place of work that evening. It is therefore relevant to the safe-

ty of his conviction and his alibi for the relevant time. The Appellant has obtained a preliminary report from an expert expressing a positive view on this question but he has asked to see the original CCTV footage given issues as to the quality of the compilation footage.

7. The Respondent originally expressed her willingness to disclose the material to the CCRC, but declined to disclose it to the Appellant directly.

8. The CCRC however, made clear that they did not propose to instruct their own expert to examine the footage. As the CCRC explained, it gave careful consideration to each of the submissions made on behalf of the Appellant regarding the CCTV evidence and considered whether any further work should be undertaken. It did not identify any work that it considered could potentially lead to a finding that would undermine the safety of the Appellant's conviction. In particular, it observed that both trial experts identified other vehicles which they considered presented in a similar way to the vehicle said to have been driven by the Appellant at the material time. Where there was a possibility that the captured image was of an alternative vehicle, this was highlighted. The CCRC found no evidence to suggest that the trial experts had not undertaken thorough and fully considered examinations of the material in question. Moreover, there were agreed sightings of the Appellant's car captured on the CCTV footage and the CCRC concluded that even if other vehicles indistinguishable to the Appellant's vehicle were captured on CCTV around the murder scene, outside the original timeframes, this would not significantly undermine the significance of the agreed sightings. For these and other reasons, the CCRC did not delay their decision on the Appellant's case to await disclosure of the original CCTV footage.

9. By a decision dated 31 October 2017, the CCRC concluded that there are no grounds to refer the Appellant's conviction to the Court of Appeal and declined to do so. By that time, the CCRC had undertaken its own enquiries and instructed further DNA testing but ultimately, had not been able to identify any new evidence or a new argument which it considered would give rise to a real possibility that the Court of Appeal would quash the Appellant's conviction. The CCRC gave comprehensive and cogent reasons for its adverse decision on the Appellant's prospects of success in an appeal against conviction.

10. Notwithstanding the CCRC's decision, and supported by a charity called "Inside Justice", the Appellant has continued to seek disclosure of the original CCTV footage. The Respondent has maintained her refusal to disclose the material to the Appellant, ultimately concluding that it is not required for a legal purpose because of the CCRC's disengagement. Further, and in any event, the Respondent concluded that it would be disproportionate to disclose the material in the particular circumstances.

11. By a judicial review claim form filed on 18 July 2018, the Appellant sought to challenge the refusal of post-conviction disclosure on public law grounds. The application was resisted. By a decision (again, using a neutral term) made on the papers, dated 11 October 2018, Andrews J refused permission to apply for judicial review and certified the application as TWM. The judge gave full reasons, concluding that there is no obligation on the Respondent in circumstances such as this to disclose material to assist the Appellant in an attempt to persuade the CCRC to change its mind. She observed that the Respondent fully complied with all her legal post-conviction disclosure obligations: the material requested was not new and it was rational for the Respondent to conclude that it is not material which might cast doubt on the safety of the conviction and that its disclosure would entail a disproportionate allocation of police resources. There was no prospect of establishing that the ongoing refusal is a disproportionate interference with the Appellant's human rights. The judge's certification of the application as TWM meant that the Appellant could not request that the decision to refuse permission should be reconsidered at an oral hearing.

60. For all these reasons, I am satisfied that decision of Andrews J refusing the application for judicial review is a judgment in a criminal cause or matter within the meaning of s.18(1)(a) SCA. That provision does not have the restricted meaning contended for by the Appellant, notwithstanding the particular consequences for this Appellant, and there is no other proper basis for restricting the effect or application of s.18(1)(a) SCA in this case. In my judgment this court has no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

61. Lord Justice Underhill: I agree that this appeal should be dismissed on the basis that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain it because Andrews J's decision to refuse permission to apply for judicial review was "a judgment ... in [a] criminal cause or matter" within the meaning of s.18(1)(a) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. My reasons are substantially the same as Simler LJ's, but I will briefly state them in my own words.

62. As to whether Andrews J's decision constituted a "judgment", Lord Hoffmann at paragraph 13 of his speech in Montgomery holds that that term applies generally to all orders made in a criminal cause or matter. That seems to me the end of the matter, although I also agree with the points made by Simler LJ at paragraphs 36-37 of her judgment.

63. As to whether that judgment was made was "in [a] criminal cause or matter", it has long been established that that phrase may cover not only decisions made in the course of criminal proceedings themselves but also decisions made by officials in relation to the criminal process, including prospective criminal proceedings. That is stated in terms by Lord Sumption at the start of paragraph 16 of his judgment in Belhaj and he goes on in that paragraph to give a number of examples. It is true that none of those examples specifically concerns a decision by a chief constable of a police force responsible for a prosecution about the disclosure of documents sought for the purpose of an intended appeal following that prosecution; but I can see no reason why such decisions should be regarded as being of any different character. The duty of disclosure relied on by the Appellant depends entirely on the involvement of the Hampshire police in the prosecution, and the availability of judicial review to challenge such a decision is, to use Lord Sumption's language at the end of paragraph 16, "an integral part of the criminal justice system". That seems to me self-evident and is no doubt why neither the parties nor the Supreme Court in Nunn, which is precisely such a case, believed that an appeal lay to this Court.

64. I do not believe that that analysis is affected by the fact that Andrews J's certification of the Appellant's application as "totally without merit" meant that he was not entitled to an oral hearing in the Administrative Court. I agree with what Simler LJ says at paragraphs 51-53 of her judgment. As she says at paragraph 54, the only way that the Appellant can realistically deploy the point is to contend that s.18(1)(a) should be interpreted differently in cases where there has been no oral hearing at first instance. There is no warrant for that distinction in the language of the provision itself, and it could only be advanced on the basis that it was nevertheless required in order to avoid a breach of Article 6 of the Convention.

65. As to that, I am far from sure that such an interpretation would be possible even having regard to the strength of the interpretative obligation under s.3 of the Human Rights Act 1998. But I am not persuaded that the unavailability of both a right to an oral renewal hearing and a right to seek permission to appeal from this Court involves any breach of the Appellant's Article 6 rights in any event. The full review of the Strasbourg case-law in the speech of Lord Hope in R (Dudson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 52, [2006] 1 AC 245 – see paragraphs 27-34 (pp. 256-9) – makes it clear that Article 6 does not require an oral hearing of every application made in the context of criminal proceedings, and more partic-

ularly of a criminal appeal. As he put it at paragraph 34 (page 259 E-F): "The application of the article to proceedings other than at first instance depends on the special features of the proceedings in question. Account must be taken of the entirety of the proceedings of which they form part, including those at first instance. Account must also be taken of the role of the person or person conducting the proceedings that are in question, the nature of the system within which they are being conducted and the scope of the powers that are being exercised. The overriding question, which is essentially a practical one as it depends on the facts of each case, is whether the issues that had to be dealt with at the stage could properly, as a matter of fair trial, be determined without hearing the applicant orally."

The same principles must, I think, apply equally to the question of whether Article 6 requires that there be a right of appeal against the refusal of an application made in the context of an appeal: what fairness requires depends on the circumstances of the particular case. In the present case, as Simler LJ says at paragraph 54, the Appellant has not only had a full trial and a right of appeal against his initial conviction (albeit not pursued) but the benefit of a full review of his case by the CCRC which has concluded (in effect) that the disclosure which he now seeks cannot assist an appeal. It is also important that the reason why he was not entitled to an oral renewal was that a High Court Judge has reached a fully-reasoned conclusion that his claim is totally without merit. In those circumstances I cannot see that the absence of a right of appeal from her decision constitutes a breach of Article 6.

66. I accept that it is very unusual in our system to encounter a judicial decision, made without a hearing, which cannot either be reviewed at an oral hearing or be the subject at least of an application for permission to appeal, and that fact has given me some pause. But I see no escape from the conclusion that that is the effect of the particular rules and statutory provisions in play in the present case; and I do not believe that it gives rise to any injustice in the circumstances of the present case.

Freed Prisoners Killing Themselves at a Rate Of One Every Two Days

Jamie Grierson , Guardian,https://is.gd/ceWCuW The number of people who took their own life while on supervision after leaving prison has increased sixfold since 2010 to a rate of one every two days, fresh analysis seen by the Guardian shows. There were 153 self-inflicted deaths among those on post-custody supervision in 2018-19, compared with 24 in 2010-11, Ministry of Justice data analysed by the charity Inquest reveals, although this is partly down to improved recording.

The suicide rate among people leaving prison in 2018-19 was 212 per 100,000, while for people serving community orders and suspended sentence orders (who are under supervision but have not been jailed), the rate falls to 132 per 100,000, Inquest said. The rate for prisoners is about 83 per 100,000 and among the general population it is about 14 per 100,000.

A joint briefing paper by Inquest's head of policy, Rebecca Roberts, and Jake Phillips of Sheffield Hallam University says all deaths of people on post-custody supervision should be investigated by an independent body such as the prisons and probation ombudsman. In the paper's foreword Inquest's executive director, Deborah Coles, says: "The figures are deeply disturbing and require urgent scrutiny, due to the current lack of independent investigation into these deaths. "Without this, we cannot fully understand what is happening or how it could be addressed. What is clear however is that people are being released into failing support systems, poverty, homelessness and an absence of services for mental health and addictions. This is state abandonment."

In light of the sharp rise in the number of deaths, Her Majesty's Prison and Probation Service and the National Probation Service have committed to performing an in-depth

review of the deaths of people under post-sentence supervision. This will include working closely with the Office for National Statistics to improve the quality of the data and to inform the MoJ's understanding. The review is due to be completed by March 2020.

However, it is understood that while probation staff help offenders find access to vital services including healthcare, housing and treatment for drug and alcohol problems, the MoJ does not expect them to have sole responsibility for caring for the people they are supervising. The prisons ombudsman opened investigations into 334 deaths in 2018-19, 96% of which were of people in prison. The only deaths of people under probation supervision that were investigated by the ombudsman were those of 12 residents in probation approved premises, some of whom will have been on post-custody supervision, the paper said.

Flash Mobs Can Benefit From Convention Protection

In Chamber judgment in the case of Obote v. Russia (application no. 58954/09) the European Court of Human Rights held, unanimously, that there had been: a violation of Article 11 (freedom of assembly) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The case concerned the applicant's prosecution for taking part in a flash mob, which the courts viewed as a static demonstration requiring previous notification. The Court considered the flash mob a "peaceful assembly" and found that the reasons given by the domestic authorities to justify its dispersal and the applicant's prosecution had not been "relevant and sufficient". It pointed out in particular that staging a demonstration without prior authorisation did not necessarily justify interfering with a person's right to freedom of assembly. Indeed, seven people standing in silence while holding a blank sheet of paper could not count as a threat to public order.

Mr Obote and six other people gathered in front of the Office of the Russian Government in January 2009 in what the applicant describes as a flash mob. They had their lips covered with adhesive tape and each held a blank sheet of paper. The police ordered the group to disperse and when Mr Obote asked for the reason for that order he was taken to the police station.

He was charged under the Code of Administrative Offences for failing to give prior notification of a public gathering, as required by the Public Events Act. A court subsequently fined him 1,000 Russian roubles (about 22 euros at the time). The court found that he had taken part in a static demonstration and that he had breached the procedure for public events. It rejected his argument that the flash mob had not counted as involvement in a public event. Mr Obote appealed against the judgment, challenging the applicability of the Public Events Act and contesting the fine. The appeal court upheld the first-instance judgment. Mr Obote complained that the authorities' putting an end to the flash mob and prosecuting him for an administrative offence had violated his rights under Article 11 (freedom of assembly and association) of the European Convention.

Decision of the Court; First, the Court found that the applicant's flash mob, as he had described it, had come within the notion of a "peaceful assembly" under Article 11 of the Convention. The dispersal of such an assembly and the sanctions against the applicant had therefore constituted an interference with his right to freedom of assembly as protected by that same article. The Government had justified that interference by referring to the legitimate aim of the prevention of disorder. However, the domestic judicial bodies had found the applicant guilty in the administrative-offence proceedings, without assessing the level of disturbance caused by the flash mob. They had simply found that the applicant had failed to comply with the prior-notification requirement.

Moreover, staging a demonstration without prior authorisation did not necessarily jus-

tify interfering with a person's right to freedom of assembly. It was important that public authorities showed a certain degree of tolerance towards demonstrators who were not violent. The Court found that seven people standing in silence while holding a blank sheet of paper could hardly be described as incitement to violence or represent a threat to public order. Where the sanctions imposed on a demonstrator were criminal in nature, although classified as administrative under domestic law, as in the applicant's case, they required all the more justification. The Court therefore found that the reasons relied on by the State had not corresponded to a pressing social need. Nor had they been sufficient to show that the interference had been "necessary in a democratic society". There had thus been a violation of Article 11.

Assisted Dying Review Rejected by High Court

Phil Newby, 49, who has motor neurone disease, had asked the High Court to undertake a 'detailed examination of the evidence' to determine whether a blanket ban on assisted dying is compatible with his human rights. In a hearing at the end of October, Newby asked Divisional Court judges Lord Justice Irwin and Mrs Justice May to examine a large body of expert evidence from around the world and to cross-examine experts.

However, in a judgment handed down this afternoon, the judges refuse Newby's application, stating: 'In our judgment, there are some questions which, plainly and simply, cannot be "resolved" by a court as no objective, single, correct answer can be said to exist. On issues such as the sanctity of life there is no consensus to be gleaned from evidence. 'The private views of judges on such moral and political questions are irrelevant, and spring from no identifiable legal principle. We struggle to see why any public conclusion judges might reach on matters beyond the resolution of evidence should carry more weight than those of any other adult citizen.' Irwin J and May J added that 'courts are not the venue for arguments which have failed to convince parliament'.

In response to the judgment, Phil Newby said: 'The High Court's decision not to hear my case…is disappointing to me and the many hundreds of others who support my case. With their support, I will be fighting on to bring attention to a law that is widely thought to be cruel, so that it can be replaced by something more humane and compassionate.' Saimo Chahal QC, Newby's solicitor said: 'It is important that the highest court should have an opportunity to consider issues which it is accepted are if transcendental importance to Phil and many others in his situation. An appeal will shortly be lodged in the Court of Appeal as the prospect of parliament considering the issues is non-existent.' Last year a case brought by Noel Conway, who also suffers from motor neurone disease, was rejected by the Supreme Court. The judgment stated: 'Under the United Kingdom's constitutional arrangements, only parliament could change this law. But the Supreme Court could, if it thought right, make a declaration that the law was incompatible with the convention rights, leaving it to parliament to decide what, if anything, to do about it.' Campaigners for assisted dying hope judges will eventually make a declaration of incompatibility.

Rapper, Rapped for Rapping

A Moroccan rapper is facing up to two years in jail in connection with a song allegedly insulting the police. Mohamed Mounir, widely known as Gnawi, was arrested at the start of the month and charged with "offending" public officials and public bodies. His arrest came just days after he released another song criticising the Moroccan authorities and the king. If convicted, Gnawi faces up to two years in prison and a fine of 5,000 Moroccan Dirhams (around £400). Human rights group Amnesty has called the trial "an outrageous assault on free speech".

At What Age Is It Right To Prosecute Children?

Emily Kent and Aaron Walawalkar: How society should deal with children who have broken the law can be a contentious topic. In Scotland, the age of criminal responsibility is set to rise from eight to 12 this month, as a new law comes into effect. In the rest of the UK, children as young as ten can be held criminally responsible for their actions – the joint lowest minimum age in the European Union. At what age should children face trial like adults?

The age of criminal responsibility is the age at which a child or young person is deemed capable of committing a crime. Children below this age are considered to lack the emotional, mental and intellectual development to be held responsible for their behaviour. In England, Wales and Northern Ireland, that age is set at ten years old. In Scotland, it has been set at eight but is rising to 12 this month following a vote in the Scottish Parliament earlier this year.

While many have welcomed the move, Scotland's children's commissioner Bruce Adamson has criticised it as not going far enough and having little impact. Only 94 children under 12 years of age were reported for committing crimes in Scotland, according to the latest figures. The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, among other groups, urged the UK to raise the minimum age to at least 14 arguing that children cannot understand the consequences of their actions in the same way adults can. It is argued the current situation is incompatible with the UK's human rights commitments. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which the UK is a signatory, defines a child as anyone under the age of 18.

The Bigger Picture Of Criminal Responsibility: Globally, the UK is seen as one of the least progressive countries when it comes to the minimum age of criminal responsibility. This is particularly glaring in the context of the European Union, where 23 of 28 member states have a minimum age of criminal responsibility of 14 or above. Currently, the only other European countries with a minimum age of criminal responsibility lower than 14 are France (13 years of age), Poland (13 years of age), Turkey (12 years of age), the Netherlands (12 years of age) and Switzerland (ten years of age). The government has said it had no plans to raise the age of criminal responsibility. A spokesman told the Guardian: "Setting the age of criminal responsibility at 10 provides flexibility in addressing offending behaviour by children and allows for early intervention to help prevent further offending." In 1999, the Human Rights Court considered the right of under-18s to a fair trial – protected under Article 6 of the Human Rights Convention – for the first time. The controversial case was brought by Robert Thompson and Jon Venables, who murdered toddler James Bulger six years previously, when they were both ten years old. The court found that Thompson and Venables' right to a fair trial was breached, due to the presence of public and press in court, the rituals and formality of the court system, and the limited explanation of court procedures. The pair have since been granted new identities and lifelong anonymity.

Serving Prisoners Supported by MOJUK: Giovanni Di Stefano, Naweed Ali, Khobaib Hussain, Mohibur Rahman, Tahir Aziz, Roger Khan, Wang Yam, Andrew Malkinson, Michael Ross, Mark Alexander, Anis Sardar, Jamie Green, Dan Payne, Zoran Dresic, Scott Birtwistle, Jon Beere, Chedwyn Evans, Darren Waterhouse, David Norris, Brendan McConville, John Paul Wooton, John Keelan, Mohammed Niaz Khan, Abid Ashiq Hussain, Sharaz Yaqub, David Ferguson, Anthony Parsons, James Cullinene, Stephen Marsh, Graham Coutts, Royston Moore, Duane King, Leon Chapman, Tony Marshall, Anthony Jackson, David Kent, Norman Grant, Ricardo Morrison, Alex Silva,Terry Smith, Hyrone Hart, Warren Slaney, Melvyn 'Adie' McLellan, Lyndon Coles, Robert Bradley, Thomas G. Bourke, David E. Ferguson, Lee Mockble, George Coleman, Neil Hurley, Jaslyn Ricardo Smith, James Dowsett, Kevan & Miran Thakrar, Jordan Towers, Patrick Docherty, Brendan Dixon, Paul Bush, Alex Black, Nicholas Rose, Kevin Nunn, Peter Carine, Paul Higginson, Robert Knapp, Thomas Petch, Vincent and Sean Bradish, John Allen, Jeremy Bamber, Kevin Lane, Michael Brown, Robert William Kenealy, Glyn Razzell, Willie Gage, Kate Keaveney, Michael Stone, Michael Attwooll, John Roden, Nick Tucker, Karl Watson, Terry Allen, Richard Southern, Jake Mawhinney, Peter Hannigan.